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THE PAQUETE HABANA: A CASE HISTORY IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Scott

w. Stuckyt

In The Paquete Habana, decided in 1900, the United States Supreme
Court adopted the doctrine that coastal fishing vessels are exempt from
capture as prize of war. The Court held that the exemption was an established custom of international law, which-in the absence of a controlling
executive or judicial decision-should be incorporated into the corpus of
our common law. The Paquete Habana influenced the development of
positive rules of international law that expanded the class of civilian vessels
that are exempt from capture. Recently, the lower federal courts have begun to utilize The Paquete Habana as precedent for the incorporation of
international law other than that governing the conduct of naval warfare.
In this article, the author analyzes the decision and its historical antecedents and examines the applicability of The Paquete Habana principle to
twentieth century naval conflicts involving the United States. The author
contends that the overriding importance of The Paquete Habana is its role
as a monument to the continuing vitality of international law.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Paquete Rabana and The Lola,l often-cited prize cases decided
by the United States Supreme Court in 1900, share a fate akin to that of
Southey's Battle of Blenheim,2 being more praised than analyzed. The
cases arose at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War when two Cuban fishing vessels, the Paquete Habana and the Lola, were captured by a
United States naval blockade squadron. Both vessels were removed from
Cuban waters and sold by the United States as prizes of war. Appeals
challenging these sales subsequently were filed in the Supreme Court, and
the cases were consolidated for argument and decision. Although The
Paquete Rabana is a staple of introductory casebooks in international
t B.A. summa cum laude, Wichita State University, 1970; J.D. Harvard Law School,
1973; M.A., Trinity University, 1980; LL.M. highest honors, George Washington
University. The author is presently Deputy Division Chief, Legislative Division,
Office of the Judge Advocate General, United States Air Force.
l. 175 U.S. 677 (1900). Unless otherwise noted, the name The Paquete Habana will
refer to both cases.
2. "And everybody praised the DukeIWho this great fight did win./'But what good
came of it at last?' Quoth little Peterkin./'Why, that I cannot tell,' said he;/'But
'twas a famous victory.''' R. SOUTHEY, THE BATTLE OF BLENHEIM (1798).
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law,3 it has received little thorough analysis. This article subjects the
case to a deeper probing and explores the origins of the case, the influences that produced the opinion, and the effect of the opinion on twentieth century international law.
Because The Paquete Habana was a Spanish-American War prize
case, Section II of this article traces the development of United States
prize law prior to 1898 and the nineteenth century efforts to establish an
internationally accepted law of prize. Section III discusses the background of the Spanish-American War relevant to The Paquete Habana
decision, particularly the blockade of Cuba. Section IV reviews the
course of The Paquete Habana from the captures through the final
Supreme Court decision and the predilection of Justice Horace Gray, author of the initial Supreme Court opinion, to analyze issues in light of
historical developments. The Paquete Habana opinion is analyzed in
Section V, with emphasis on its effect on the legal community. Section
VI discusses the impact of the case on international law, especially its
effect on the Second Hague Conference of 1907, which enacted into positive international law the prize law principle that coastal fishing vessels
are immune from capture. Sections VII and VIII examine the principle
as applied in this century's two world wars. Section IX identifies the
relevance of the principle to, and examines its use in, the limited war
situations that have occurred since 1945. Finally, Section X examines
the impact of The Paquete Habana on the current attitude of the United
States toward international law in areas other than prize law.
II.

UNITED STATES PRIZE LAW PRIOR TO 1898

The American law of maritime prize is older than the nation itself.
In fact, maritime prize law gave rise to the first distinctively federal court
under the Confederation - the Court of Appeals in Cases of Prize and
Capture. 4 The genesis of American maritime prize law, however, resulted from the work of John Marshall and his brethren on the Supreme
Court during the War of 1812. The origin of the war with regard to
neutral rights and naval impressment, together with the imposition of a
general embargo shortly before war was declared, produced an extraordinary number of prize cases for the Court. 5
3. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 26 (3d ed. 1971); C.
FENWICK, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (2d ed. 1951); M. McDOUGAL &

4.

5.

W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY 77 (1981); H. STEINER & D. VAGTS,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS: MATERIALS AND TEXT 531 (1976); B. WESTON, R. FALK, & A. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A
PROBLEM-ORIENTED CASEBOOK 174 (1980).
See generally H. BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT: THE FEDERAL ApPELLATE PRIZE COURT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1977); J. GOEBEL,
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 in 1 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 147-95 (1971).
G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-
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The most famous of these was The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,6 which has been called "one of the great fundamental decisions in
internationallaw."7 In establishing that an armed foreign public vessel,
formerly taken as prize by the French, was immune from subsequent
American admiralty jurisdiction, Justice Marshall promulgated a principle that has endured in American law. 8 After canvassing the state of
international practice, Justice Marshall emphasized the limiting effect of
international law and custom on domestic jurisdiction. In Justice Marshall's view, the values inherent in "distinct sovereignties. . . whose mutual benefit is promoted by intercourse with each other and by an
interchange of those good offices which humanity dictates"9 necessitated
a reciprocal relaxation of otherwise complete municipal authority.
The Schooner Exchange was not the only prize case arising during
the war. The Court also decided cases on such recurring issues of prize
law as the "days of grace" allowed to expatriate goods from Britain,1O the
problems associated with American or neutral individuals or firms having enemy commercial domiciles, II the rights of individuals shipping
neutral goods on British ships,12 and the use of neutral flags as a cover to
ship enemy goods. 13
In view of this outpouring of prize cases, it is not surprising that, at
the end of the war, Henry Wheaton, later the Supreme Court's reporter,

6.
7.

8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

1815 in 2 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 438-39 (1971).
II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
I C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 425-26 (1937).
The fact that the principle prize reports available at that time were Sir William
Scott's from the first Napoleonic War, see 1-6 C. Rob. Adm. (1798-1808); E. RosCOE, LORD STOWELL, HIS LIFE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH PRIZE LAW
(1916) (passim), together with Justice Story's opinion that English precedent should
control, G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 442; see The Nereide, 13 U.S.
(9 Cranch) 388, 436-56 (1815); The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 287-88, 299
(1814), caused a certain lack of solicitude for neutral rights in some cases. Chief
Justice Marshall strongly fought this tendency, making the case for an American
prize law better suited to a state that was not a great naval power and that, as a
matter of policy, attempted to avoid involvement in European wars. See The Venus,
12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253 (1814) (Marshall, C. J.); G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, supra
note 5, at 441-42, 449. He prevailed, and a pragmatic attitude toward English precedent came to be accepted, one that fit the nation's nineteenth and twentieth-century policy emphasis on neutral rights. G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, supra note 5,
at 449.
See, e.g., Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562,574 (1926) (extending the
principle elucidated in The Schooner Exchange to merchant ships of foreign governments); see also Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587-88 (1943) (citing The Schooner
Exchange for the proposition that executive branch action preempts jurisdiction of
the district court on the issue of immunity).
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136-37 (1812).
The Thomas Gibbons, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 421 (1814).
The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253 (1814).
The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815); Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle,
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191 (1815).
Cargo of the Ship Hazard v. Campbell, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 205 (1815).
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authored the first American treatise on prize law, A Digest of the Law of
Maritime Capture and Prize. 14 This book contains a significant number
of American cases that demonstrate the Court's divergence from English
law. 15 The book is also a useful aid in analyzing The Paquete Habana
because it contains perhaps the first American statement on the central
question in The Paquete Habana: Are fishing vessels immune from capture? Wheaton wrote:
[I]t has been usual in maritime wars to exempt from capture
fishing boats and their cargoes, both from views of mutual accommodation between neighboring countries, and from tenderness to a poor and industrious order of people. This custom, so
honorable to the humanity of civilized nations, has fallen into
disuse; and it is remarkable that both France and England mutually reproach each other with that breach of good faith which
has finally abolished it. 16
Wheaton was mistaken in stating that the custom had disappeared;
although, as noted in The Paquete Habana opinion, the status of the custom had been uncertain during the early Napoleonic WarsY The famous English writer, Joseph Chitty (upon whom Wheaton clearly
relied), gave a brief but accurate account of the early nineteenth century
English view in his Treatise on the Law of Nations: 18 "In some wars, it
has been usual to make an exception in favour of small fishing-vessels,
from tenderness to a poor and industrious order of people. This, however, as appears from the case of The Young Jacob and Johanna, is a
matter of forbearance, and not of right." 19
The case of The Young Jacob and Johanna 20 was the leading English
authority on the issue of the fishing boat exemption. In that case, a small
Dutch fishing boat was taken by a British ship while returning from the
Dogger Bank to Holland. Although Sir William Scott recognized that it
had been the general custom in former wars not to make prizes of such
vessels, he stated that this was a rule of comity only, not of international
law. Thus, under general principles of prize law, the vessel could be condemned as one engaged in enemy trade. To the argument that such boats
bore no national character, but frequently came to England to sell their
fish, Scott replied that the argument need not be addressed because the
indicia in this case pointed to Dutch trade. Moreover, Scott stated that
14.

H. WHEATON, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF MARITIME CAPTURE AND PRIZE
(1815).
15. Id.; G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 452.
16. H. WHEATON, supra note 14, at 60-61.
17. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 691-93 (1900).
18. J. CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NATIONS, RELATIVE TO THE

19.
20.

LEGAL EFFECT OF WAR ON THE COMMERCE OF BELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRALS;
AND ON ORDERS IN COUNCIL AND LICENSES (1812).
Id. at 87.
1 C. Rob. Adm. 20 (1798).
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there was a strong indication of fraud in this case. 21
The Young Jacob and Johanna thus indicates a rather mixed attitude toward the fishing boat exemption. The existence of a general practice based on comity was accepted; however, the conditional and
nonbinding nature of the exemption was emphasized. The holding was
further complicated by Scott's statement that fraud was strongly indicated. Tacit recognition of the exemption combined with the belief that
it was only a matter of comity, rather than a rule of international law,
would mark the English attitude on the question of fishing vessel immunity for another century.
With the end of the War of 1812, American prize courts ceased activity. The next major developments in the American law of prize came
with the Civil War. The nature of the Civil War at sea - an internecine
conflict between an established government attempting to blockade an
enormous length of coastline, and an insurgent regime seeking supplies,
trade, and recognition abroad - naturally gave rise to a different mix of
questions than had the War of 1812. Particularly important were questions regarding the status of the conflict as a "war" under international
law, the rights of neutrals colorably attempting to trade with the Confederacy, and the character of property owned by domiciliaries of the Confederacy (i.e., whether such property was contraband).
Fundamental questions regarding the status of the conflict and the
legality of prize action taken in reliance thereon were answered in the
celebrated Prize Cases. 22 The Supreme Court held that the President did
not need congressional approval to institute a blockade of the states then
in rebellion and that the property of those residing or domiciled therein,
although belonging to American citizens, was a proper subject of capture
and condemnation in prize. 23 The Court found that the conflict was a
"war" for purposes of international law and that the existence of a state
of war permitted the Union to avail itself of belligerent rights. No declaration of war was necessary; the President's assessment of the situation
and his action thereon was sufficient.24 This decision announced principles of executive power that are important even today, and is notable for
its treatment of international law as a dynamic, flexible instrument concerned with the reality of affairs and not trammeled by categories of municipal legislation.
The contraband question was treated in The PeterhoJ:P5 in a manner
that survived until World War I. Essentially, items classified as contraband (most notably munitions and arms, but other things as well) could
be seized and condemned from neutral vessels if it were shown that the
items were intended for belligerent use; an overt attempt to run the
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

[d. at 20-21.
67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
[d. at 665-74.
[d. at 669-71.
72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 28 (1867).
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blockade was not necessary. Noncontraband, however, could be seized
only if a breach of the blockade was intended. 26 In a tangential line of
prize cases,27 the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of "continuous
voyage" to condemn both cargoes and ships. "Continuous voyage," an
English doctrine, meant that a neutral ship carrying contraband was
good prize if captured on the high seas during a voyage between two
neutral ports, provided the voyage would ultimately end with delivery of
the contraband to a belligerent. In The Bermuda,28 the leading continuous voyage case, the Court relied substantially on English law to buttress
its departure from the traditional American solicitude for neutral
rights. 29 Interestingly, the Union's naval position in relation to the Confederate property was analogous to the British position with regard to
American property during the War of 1812, when American policy had
opposed "continuous voyage" and other manifestations of British
power. 30
The vexing question regarding the status of the property of Confederate domiciliaries as prize, answered generally in the Prize Cases,31 was
given a closer analysis in The Grey Jacket. 32 In that case, the issue was
whether the property of a Confederate domiciliary who claimed to have
remained loyal to the Union could be condemned as prize. The Court, in
a rather stringent opinion, held that domicile was dispositive of the enemy character of the property. A lone exception was provided for loyal
persons who, upon the outbreak of hostilities, had escaped with what
possessions they could transport. This principle, which also was applied
to Army seizures of property on land,33 would playa significant role in
the government's case in The Paquete Habana.
Thus, by 1865 a significant body of American prize law had developed as the result of two separate conflicts that presented disparate challenges to American naval policy. Much of the law, particularly that
produced by the War of 1812, was built upon British principles of comity. In later prize cases arising out of the Civil War,34 however, American jurists took a rather pragmatic and even teleological view of
international law as a body of jurisprudence capable of growth through
changes in accepted international custom.
With regard to the development of international law, another case,
26. Id. at 55-62.
27. The Springbok, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 1 (1867); The Bermuda, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 514
(1866); The Hart, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 559 (1866).
28. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 514 (1866).
29. Id. at 554-58.
30. A residual concern for neutral rights can be seen in The Springbok, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 1 (1867), where the Court, upholding the condemnation of the cargo, reversed condemnation of the vessel on the ground that the master believed in good
faith that he was making a legitimate voyage from London to Nassau.
31. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
32. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 342 (1867).
33. Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 404 (1865).
34. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.

1985]

Coastal Fishing Vessel Immunity

7

The Scotia,35 must be briefly mentioned. This was not a prize case, but
one in admiralty, arising from a collision between American and British
ships. The question was whether certain nautical "rules of the road,"
adopted in Britain by Orders in Council in 1863 and in the United States
by an Act of Congress in 1864,36 were applicable to an international collision on the high seas. In finding the rules applicable, the Court refused
to limit the municipal laws to each nation's vessels, and held that the
"common consent of civilized communities" - the adoption of the same
rules by thirty nations within a few years of Britain's action - had made
the rules part of customary international law. As such, the rules were
obligatory on nations and their vessels. 37 This recognition of accepted
international custom as making new, binding international law without
any formal international agreement was clearly a doctrine with a potential for significant development, and one that would be of great importance to The Paquete Habana.
Although the United States was not directly involved, multilateral
developments in the law of naval warfare occurred during the nineteenth
century. The developments were indicative of a growing feeling among
nations and among jurists that amelioration of the conditions of warfare
was possible. This gradual development of law is one of the touchstones
of The Paquete Habana.
The most notable multilateral treaty dealing with naval warfare in
the nineteenth century was the Declaration of Paris in 1856, which abolished privateering and enunciated certain principles that reduced the permissible limits of capture. 38 The United States did not adhere to the
Declaration. In fact, during the Civil War,39 the Confederacy actually
issued letters of marque and reprisal and engaged in privateering. 40 A
notable effort to produce a codification of prize law, which included the
introduction of an international prize court, was made by the Institute of
International Law in the 1880's. In three sessions, at Turin in 1882, Munich in 1883, and Heidelberg in 1887, the Institute produced a lengthy
model prize code. Article 110 of the code prohibited the seizure as prize
of a broad variety of vessels, including fishing vessels, and privately
owned cargo, unless a prize court determined that a particular vessel had
violated the code. 41 Acts that constituted violations of the code were set
out in Article 112 and included breach of blockade, resistance to stop35. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170 (1872).
36. Act of Apr. 29, 1864, ch. 69, 13 Stat. 58 (amended by Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 100,
§ 47, 16 Stat. 453).
37. The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187-88 (1872).
38. F. PIGGOTT, THE DECLARATION OF PARIS 1856, at 179-80 (1919).
39. Id. at 142.
40. See W. ROBINSON, THE CONFEDERATE PRIVATEERS (1928). The threat of Con federate privateering provoked a belated but abortive American offer to adhere to the
Declaration. See also A. NEVINS, THE IMPROVISED WAR 1861-1862 in 5 THE
ORDEAL OF THE UNION 208 (1959); F. PIGGOTT, supra note 38, at 154-61.
41. J. SCOTT, RESOLUTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW DEALING
WITH THE LAW OF NATIONS 75-76 (1916).

8

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 15

ping or search, and participation in hostilities. 42 Although these regulations, if adopted, would have drastically cut back the ambit of prize law,
the proposed substantive limits on capture apparently provoked little dissent. Instead, disagreement over the jurisdiction and composition of the
proposed international court precluded adoption of this code. 43
The effort to codify international prize law was part of a larger
movement, which included the Declaration of Paris. The movement was
undertaken to purge the practice of warfare of methods that were
deemed to be barbaric relics, among which was the opportunity for turning a private profit out of the public act of naval warfare. By 1895, an
English international lawyer, although noting that the exemption of fishing boats from capture was a somewhat debatable point as a matter of
law, opined that no civilized belligerent would now capture the boats of
fishermen plying their avocation peaceably in the territorial waters of
their own state. 44 This proposition was shortly put to the test when two
"civilized belligerents," the United States and Spain, went to war.
III.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

Examination of American political and naval policy and strategy is
essential to an understanding of the facts in The Paquete Habana. After
the sinking of the battleship U.S.S. Maine in Havana harbor on February
15, 1898, American public opinion, already inflamed by overheated press
coverage of Cuban events, turned strongly toward a stern policy, including war if necessary, with Spain. Spain had made substantial concessions
and, being wretchedly unprepared, was anxious to avoid war.4S John
Davis Long, President McKinley's Navy Secretary, wrote in his diary on
April 5, 1898, "the country is so clamorous for action that the President
cannot delay 10nger,"46 and the day after he stated, "[t]he members of
the House and Senate. . . are violently pressed by their constituents for
some positive action."47
President McKinley's message to Congress of April 11, 1898, barely
mentioned Spanish efforts at compromise and essentially gave Congress
carte blanche to deal with the affair. 48 Congress responded on April 20,
1898, with a joint resolution so truculent and bellicose that Spain had no
choice but to declare war. The joint resolution demanded that Spain at
42. [d. at 76.
43. REGLEMENT
44.
45.

INTERNATIONAL DES PRISES MARITIMES: PROJET ADOPTE PAR
L'INSTITUTE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 7-11 (1888).
T. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 383 (1895); see also W.
HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 381-83 (1880).
1 F. CHADWICK, THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN: THE
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 33-46, 51-54, 94-126 (1911); D. TRASK, THE WAR WITH
SPAIN IN 1898 11-29 (1981).
J. LONG, AMERICA OF YESTERDAY 176 (1923).

46.
47. [d. at 177.
48. S. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 118 (rev. ed.
1972).
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once relinquish its authority and withdraw from Cuba and its waters and
authorized the President to use the military forces of the United States to
carry out the Congressional mandate. 49 Spain promptly severed diplomatic relations with the United States, and on April 22, 1898, President
McKinley proclaimed a blockade of Cuban ports. Secretary Long, who
had no illusions as to what this portended, recorded on April 21, 1898:
"One of the busiest days of the season. Appoint Captain Sampson as
Acting Admiral. Telegraph him to move at once to blockade Cuba,
which, of course, is the beginning of war."50
American naval strategy in the event of a war with Spain had been
under consideration for some months. A vital element in that strategy
was a close naval blockade of Cuba, or as much of its coastline as American naval forces could patrol. Strategists believed the blockade would
starve the Spanish army quartered in Cuba into submission without a
fight, because the Cuban insurrection that precipitated the conflict had
reduced available food supplies. The fear that American land forces
would be decimated by tropical disease also encouraged implementation
of this tactic. Furthermore, the blockade was expected to destroy Spanish West Indian commerce and was intended to place a significant logistical burden on Spain by forcing her to succor Cuba from a distance of
3,000 miles. 51
The blockade strategy also evidenced a respect for the Spanish
armed forces that was not always borne out by the performance of Spanish troops in combat. Captain (later Rear Admiral) William T. Sampson, who was to command the blockading squadron, favored an
immediate naval attack on Havana. The Navy Department overruled
this, fearing that too many American ships would be damaged and rendered unavailable for battle with the Spanish Navy. The blockade was
viewed as a safer alternative that would reduce Spanish land forces without risking American ships against the shore batteries of Havana. 52
The original blockade instructions from Secretary Long to Admiral
Sampson, dated April 6, 1898, provided for a blockade of most of the
Cuban coast:
The Department further desires that, in case of war, you
will maintain a strict blockade of Cuba, particularly at the
ports of Havana, Matanzas, and, if possible, of Santiago de
Cuba, Manzanillo, and Cienfuegos. Such a blockade may cause
the Spaniards to yield before the rainy season is over. . . . All
prizes should be sent to Key West or other available U.S. ports
for adjudication. 53
49. S. Con. Res. 24, 30 Stat. 738-39 (1898).
50. J. LONG, THE JOURNAL OF JOHN DAVIS LONG 223 (1956).
51. J. LONG, THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 228-29 (1979).
52. [d. at 231.
53. Annual Report o/the Navy Department/or the Year 1898: Appendix to the Report 0/
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This was an ambitious plan. During the next two weeks, however, as war
approached, it became increasingly apparent that the naval force at Rear
Admiral Sampson's disposal would be insufficient for such a task, especially because a portion of the American fleet had to be kept in readiness
to deal with a Spanish squadron then in the Cape Verde Islands. Obviously, these vessels could not be tied down with blockade duty.54 Thus,
when the order to impose the blockade came, it was significantly more
limited:
The Department's instructions of April 6 are modified as
follows: You will immediately institute a blockade of the north
coast of Cuba, extending from Cardenas on the east to Bahia
Honda on the west; also, if in your opinion your force warrants,
the port of Cienfuegos on the south side of the island. 55
President McKinley's proclamation of blockade was issued on April
22, 1898. After reciting its terms, the demands of the United States, and
the authority of Congress's joint resolution, the proclamation stated that
a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including ports on the coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and of Cienfuegos on the south coast,
would be maintained "in pursuance of the laws of the United States and
the laws of nations applicable to such cases."56 Neutral vessels approaching these ports or attempting to leave them in ignorance of the
blockade would be stopped and warned, and indorsements made of the
warnings on their logs. Such vessels twice attempting to enter would be
captured and sent in for adjudication as prize. Thirty days' grace was
given neutral vessels to leave Cuban portsY The proclamation was a
formal notice to neutral nations of the blockade, as was required then by
international law; however, it contained no mention of Spanish vessels.
War was formally declared by an Act of Congress on April 25, 1898,
retroactive to April 21, 1898. 58 On the following day, President McKinley issued a proclamation declaring the rules under which the United
States proposed to conduct the naval war. 59 This document eschewed
any resort to privateering, stating that the United States would adhere to
the Declaration of Paris.60 It further proclaimed, in accord with the
Declaration of Paris, that enemy goods under neutral flags, except for
contraband, would be protected; that neutral goods, not contraband,
the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation 171 (1898) [hereinafter cited as Navy Report
Appendix].
54. J. LONG, supra note 50, at 232-34, 237.
55. Letter from Secretary Long to Rear Admiral Sampson, (Apr. 21, 1898), in Navy
Report Appendix, supra note 53, at 175.
56. Proclamation of Apr. 22, 1898, in PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1898, at 769 (1901) [hereinafter cited as FOREIGN
RELATIONS].

57. !d. at 769-70.
58. Act of Apr. 25, 1898, ch. 189, 30 Stat. 364 (1898).
59. Proclamation of Apr. 26, 1898, in FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 56, at 772-73.
60. !d. at 772.
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under the Spanish flag would not be confiscated; and that the blockade,
in order to be binding on vessels attempting to enter or leave Cuba, must
be maintained by a sufficient number of ships.61 Spanish ships in American ports were given thirty days' grace to leave. Spanish ships bound for
the United States prior to April 21, 1898, would not be molested. The
right of search was "to be exercised with strict regard for the rights of
neutrals,"62 and mail steamers were not to be interfered with "except on
the clearest grounds of suspicion. "63 The proclamation, in a phrase
which also became a part of The Paquete Habana litigation, stated that
the war "should be conducted upon principles in harmony with the present views of nations and sanctioned by their recent practice."64 The
proclamation, however, provided no exceptions from capture for any
class of Spanish ships, other than the thirty days of grace.
President McKinley's proclamation represented an amelioration of
the stringent interdiction of trade that marked American prize cases in
the Civil War, particularly the substantial restraints on neutral rights
practiced during that war to restrain trade with the Confederacy.65 The
1898 proclamation was in some sense a return to earlier American solicitude for neutral rights. International law, as developed in the later nineteenth century, exerted only a marginal influence on the promulgation of
President McKinley's proclamation. A far more significant influence
was McKinley's desire to mollify the European nations, a number of
whom looked askance at the American declaration of war.66
Spain, by Royal Decree of April 23, 1898, issued a proclamation
analogous to President McKinley's. The Spanish proclamation differed
from its American counterpart in three important respects: Spain reserved the right to commission privateers and issue letters of marque,
although it stated that for the moment it would restrict itself to commissioning merchant vessels as auxiliary naval cruisers; the proclamation
contained an open-ended list of contraband items; and the proclamation
contained a provision evidently directed at potential American use of
vessels manned by Cuban insurgents, which stated that captains and officers of non-American vessels, or of vessels manned by more than onethird non-Americans, who were captured while engaged in war against
Spain, would be treated as pirates. 67
On April 24, 1898, Spain issued detailed instructions to its navy re61. Id.
62.Id.
63.Id.
64. Id. On the same day, Representative Gillett of Massachusetts introduced, with Administration support, a resolution that no privateers be commissioned by the United
States, and that Spanish vessels be exempt from capture, except for those bearing
contraband or breaching the blockade. New York Commercial, Apr. 26, 1898, at 1,
col. 4.
65. See The Bermuda, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 514 (1866).
66. S. MORISON, supra note 48, at 119-20; J. LONG, supra note 51, at 233.
67. FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 56, at 774-75.
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garding the exercise of the right to visit,68 which contained substantial
citations of the 1864 and 1868 Geneva Conventions relating to hospital
ships and the treatment of wounded and sick combatants. 69 The United
States, however, did not issue instructions to its blockading fleet until
June 11, 1898. 70 The American instructions elaborated on the proclamation on April 26, 1898, without any significant departures from generally
accepted principles of international law. In carrying out the policy of not
offending neutral European nations, the instructions cautioned that "the
crews of blockade runners are not enemies and should be treated not as
prisoners of war, but with every consideration."71 Other than the days of
grace allowed in the April 26, 1898, proclamation, no exemptions from
capture for Spanish vessels were provided, and the instructions did not
mention immunity for fishing vessels. Detailed instructions were given
on the bringing in of prizes for adjudication. The substantial amount of
space devoted to prize adjudication in the American proclamation clearly
demonstrated that the United States, although anxious not to offend European neutrals, nevertheless intended to carryon vigorous warfare
against Spanish commerce.
Notwithstanding the insufficiency of American naval forces, a
blockade was fixed around ports on the north coast of Cuba and was in
place when war was declared. Within a day or two of the blockade's
inception, a new problem presented itself to Rear Admiral Sampson and
Secretary Long, one which seemingly had not been considered during the
hasty and improvised blockade planning. This was the problem of
whether Cuban fishing vessels, most of which were small coastal craft,
should be seized. A number of these vessels had been taken in the first
days of the war. On April 28, 1898, Rear Admiral Sampson wrote to
Secretary Long concerning the problem:
I find that a large number of fishing schooners are attempting to get into Havana from their fishing grounds near the Florida reefs and coasts. They are generally manned by excellent
seamen, belonging to the maritime inscription of Spain, who
have already served in the Spanish navy, and who are liable to
further service. As these trained men are naval reserve, have a
semi-military character, and would be most valuable to the
Spaniards as artillerymen, either afloat or ashore, I recommend
68. The "right of visit" is the right of a warship to stop a suspicious vessel and send an
officer aboard to ascertain the vessel's nationality. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1409
(5th ed. 1979).
69. FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 56, at 775-79.
70. /d. at 780.
71. [d. at 781. One instruction deserves mention in view of later American actions: it
authorized the destruction of vessels taken as prize only if they could not be sent in,
or appraised and sold on the spot. This was to be done only in the case of "controlling reasons," such as unseaworthiness or lack of a prize crew. In any such case,
the papers were to be preserved and sent to the prize court for adjudication. [d. at
782.
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that they should be detained prisoners of war, and that I should
be authorized to deliver them to the commanding officer of the
army at Key West. 72
Secretary Long, who contemporaneously had received a letter from a
Boston friend with information of a petition calling for immunity of all
Spanish private property,73 replied, "Spanish fishing vessels attempting
to violate [the] blockade are subject, with crew, to capture, and any such
vessel or crew considered likely to aid enemy may be detained. "74
This exchange, important to blockade policy and The Paquete Rabana case, warrants analysis. Evidently, Rear Admiral Sampson believed there were some limits, however inchoate, on the capture of fishing
vessels. The fishing vessels were under the Spanish flag and did not fall
within the days of grace exemption in President McKinley's proclamation. Therefore, any exemption for them would have to be based on international custom, not on American instructions. Moreover, Sampson's
request seems to have been tacitly limited to crewmen who might reasonably have been expected to take part in hostilities, although there was no
indication that any of them had done so. An argument of military necessity would have been on stronger ground with such naval reservists
rather than with the general run of fishermen; indeed, reservists might
have been denominated combatants per se and, as such, not entitled to an
exemption. Secretary Long's reply was broader than Rear Admiral
Sampson's question; the reply covered all Spanish fishermen attempting
to violate the blockade and imposed only the very broad criterion of
whether the fishermen were "likely" to aid the enemy. This gave the
blockading forces a great deal of discretion, because virtually anything,
including fish, a staple food, could aid a blockaded enemy. It appears
that the Secretary was less concerned with questions of international custom in this area than with maintaining an effective blockade, although he
may have gained the impression from Rear Admiral Sampson that the
only persons fishing in the West Indies were Spanish naval reservists. In
any event, the question of the immunity from capture of small fishing
vessels evidently was not considered during the planning of the American
blockade. 75
72. Letter from Rear Admiral Sampson to Secretary Long (Apr. 28, 1898) in Navy
Report Appendix, supra note 53, at 178.
73. The friend was the noted Henry Lee Higginson, who wrote Secretary Long that "[a]
petition to the President that 'seizures upon the seas of private properties of
Spaniards be prohibited' is brought to me for circulation," and asked Long what he
should do with the petition. Such a prohibition would certainly have covered the
cargoes of the Paquete Habana and Lola, and would seem to have covered even
privately owned contraband. There is no record of Secretary Long's reply. Letter of
H.L. Higginson to Secretary Long (Apr. 28, 1898) in J. LONG, THE PAPERS OF
JOHN DAVIS LONG, 1897-1904 at 107-08 (1939).
74. Letter from Secretary Long to Rear Admiral Sampson (Apr. 30, 1898) in Navy
Report Appendix, supra note 53, at 178.
75. The question initially arose in a message from a combat commander at the outset of
war, but in a muddied fashion that did not clearly present the basic immunity ques-
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Nonetheless, the fishing vessel immunity question ultimately provided the basis for The Paquete Habana. Two of the fishing vessels mentioned by Rear Admiral Sampson in his letters to Secretary Long were
the Paquete Habana and the Lola. Both vessels were captured in the
very first days of war. Even as Secretary Long replied to the Admiral,
these vessels already were in Key West, beginning their trek into legal
history.
IV.

A.

PAQUETE HABANA AND LOLA

The Facts

The Paquete Habana was a sloop, forty-three feet long, displacing
twenty-five tons. She was owned by Justa Galban, a woman of Spanish
descent living in Havana, and captained by Juan Pasos, also a Cuban of
Spanish descent. In addition to Pasos she carried a crew of three men.
Neither Pasos nor the ship had any commission, both had only a license
from the Spanish government to fish.76 The ship left Havana on March
25, 1898, and proceeded to Cape San Antonio, where the crew fished for
twenty-five days before sailing back to Havana with a cargo of forty quintals, or about 8,800 pounds, of live fish.77
Out on the sea, the ship and its crew were isolated from society and
world affairs. By the time the fishermen began their return journey, the
blockade of the northern coast of Cuba was in effect. On April 25, 1898
- the first day of the war - the Paquete Habana was captured off
Mariel, near Havana, by the gunboat U.S.S. Castine. 78 It was undisputed
tion. See supra text accompanying note 72. The treatment of fishing vessels was not
clarified prior to the end of the war. On June 25, 1898, the warship U.S.S. Yankee
captured five small vessels off the Isle of Pines. Upon learning that they were "fishing for the Havana market," the captain of the Yankee ordered their destruction, "it
being impractical to take these small vessels to Key West." Letter from Commander
W. H. Brownson to Rear Admiral Sampson (June 27, 1898) in Navy Report Appendix, supra note 53, at 218. Arguably, this violated Sampson's instructions of June
11, 1898, which permitted destruction only if "controlling reasons" were present,
and if the ship could not be appraised and sold on the spot. See supra note 71. The
likely reason for the destruction was the lack of a prize crew. Commanders in the
blockading fleet complained of the lack of ships and the difficulty of interdicting
coastal commerce with heavy-draft seagoing vessels. See Letter from Commander
W.H. Brownson to Rear Admiral Sampson (June 27, 1898) in Navy Report Appendix, supra note 53, at 218; Letters from Commodore J.A. Howell to Rear Admiral
Sampson (July 17 & 27, 1898) and to Secretary Long (July 27, 1898) in Navy Report
Appendix, supra note 53, at 256-60; Letter from Commander Richardson Clover,
U.S.S. Bancroft, to Rear Admiral Sampson (Aug. 9, 1898) in Navy Report Appendix,
supra note 52, at 289-92. Although the blockade had some economic effect upon
the poorer classes of Havana, it did not starve the Spanish army into submission;
United States forces had to fight several sharp land actions to defeat the Spaniards.
J. LONG, supra note 51, at 234-36.
76. Deposition of Juan Pasos at 10, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
77. Affidavit of Juan Pasos, at 14, The Paquete Habana.
78. Appeal at 3-4, The Paquete Habana; Annual Report of the Navy Department for the
Year 1898 at 331 [hereinafter cited as Navy Dept. Report]. The U.S.S. Castine had
left Key West on April 21, 1898, for blockade duty and returned on May 3, 1898.
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that, at the time of the capture, the crew of the Paquete Habana knew
nothing of the blockade or the war. The humble nature of the mariners
involved was evident by the size of the ship and crew, the crews' wages of
a share of the catch rather than money, and the reply of Captain Pasos
when asked whether he had written anything down about the capture.
His reply was, "I cannot write much."79 Although the crew was ignorant of the blockade and the ship was not suited for naval combat, both
crew and vessel immediately were taken to Key West for adjudication.
On April 27, 1898, a libel was filed against the vessel by the United States
Attorney for the Southern District of Florida. 80
The Lola was a larger ship than the Paquete Habana, and was returning from a longer journey when she ran afoul of the blockade. She
was a two-masted schooner, fifty-one feet long, displacing thirty-five
tons, owned by Severo Gonzales, a Cuban born in Spain. She was
captained by Tomas Betancourt, a Spanish subject living in Havana. In
addition to Betancourt, the Lola carried a crew of five. Neither
Betancourt nor the ship had any license or commission. 81 The Lola departed Havana on April 11, 1898, eleven days prior to President McKinley's proclamation of the blockade, and proceeded to Campeche Sound,
off the coast of Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula. After taking in some
10,000 pounds of live fish in eight days, the Lola set course for Havana. 82
On April 26, 1898, the Lola was stopped near Havana by the U.S.S.
Cincinnati. 83 Upon learning the Lola knew nothing of either the blockade or the war, the Cincinnati warned her not to try entering Havana;
instead, Betancourt was told he could land at Bahia Honda, a smaller
Cuban port. The Lola accordingly changed course for the latter port. 84
The next morning, off Bahia Honda, she was captured by the unarmored
cruiser U.S.S. Dolphin. 85 She, like the Paquete Habana, was taken into
Key West and libeled as a prize.
As the nearest American port to the Cuban blockade, and the seat of
Navy Dept. Report at 331. Although she was a giant compared to the Paquete Ha-

79.
80.
81.
82.

83.
84.
85.

bana, being 204 feet long, displacing 1,177 tons, and armed with eight four-inch
rifles and four six-pounders, she illustrated the motley, improvised nature of the
blockading fleet. Deficient in stability as originally designed, she had been altered to
take a lighter armament. A contemporary nonetheless described her as a "singlescrew vessel, weak and unsatisfactory." 2 U.S. NAVY, DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
NAVAL FIGHTING SHIPS 50 (1963); H. WILSON, THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN 53
(1900).
Affidavit of Juan Pasos at 11, The Paquete Habana.
Appeal at 3-4, The Paquete Habana.
Deposition of Tomas Betancourt at 9, The Paquete Habana.
[d. at 10.
Navy Dept. Report, supra note 78, at 332.
Deposition of Tomas Betancourt at 10-11, The Paquete Habana.
[d. at 3-4. The U.S.S. Dolphin was larger than the U.S.S. Castine, displacing 1,486
tons and being 256 feet long. She was, however, also lightly armed (two four-inch
guns and five three-pounders) and her lack of real fighting power is evident from her
subsequent service to the Secretaries of the Navy as a yacht. 2 U.S. NAVY, DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN NAVAL FIGHTING SHIPS 285 (1963).
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a United States District Court, Key West was the center of prize adjudication throughout the war. One observer wrote, "Key West harbor at
this time was full of shipping. The masts of the Spanish prizes rose like a
forest. "86 Thus, it was not surprising that the Paquete Habana and the
Lola had to wait some weeks for a hearing.
The cases came before District Court Judge James W. Locke87 on
May 23, 1898, and decrees of condemnation were entered, evidently by
default. The masters of these ships, speaking little English, untrained in
law, not represented by counsel, and in the midst of a foreign proceeding,
did little in their own defense. Fortunately, Joseph Parker Kirlin entered
the case as counsel for the Paquete Habana and the Lola. Although it is
not known exactly how he became involved in these cases, Kirlin was
well on his way to legal prominence of such a degree that he was described after his death as "the undisputed leader of the Admiralty
Bar."s8
Kirlin entered the litigation sometime between May 23, 1898, when
the decrees of condemnation were entered, and May 28, 1898. On the
latter date Judge Locke entertained motions from him in both cases, asking that the decrees affecting both the Paquete Habana and the Lola be
vacated on the basis that, under general law and the presidential proclamation of April 26, 1898, the fishing boats were not lawful prize. 89 Judge
Locke denied the motions in decrees of May 30, 1898, stating that the
court, "not being satisfied that as a matter of law, without any ordinance,
treaty, or proclamation, fishing vessels of this class are exempt from
seizure,"9o ordered condemnation, forfeiture, and sale of the vessels and
cargo.91
86. W. GOODE, WITH SAMPSON THROUGH THE WAR 53 (1899).
87. Judge Locke (1837-1922), who had been the District Judge for the Southern District
of Florida at Key West since 1872, had an interesting career. Born in Vermont, he
enlisted in the navy as a paymaster's clerk in 1861, and was mustered out at Key
West in 1865. Evidently liking Key West, he stayed there to practice law, and served
as a county judge and in the Reconstruction legislature before President Grant appointed him to the federal bench. This carpetbag Republican far outlasted Reconstruction, serving as District Judge for 40 years until his resignation in 1912.
Obituary, New York Times, Sept. 7, 1922, at 17.
88. Maritime Law Association of the United States, Annual Meetings 1932-39, Appendix II, Annual Report of the Secretary 1608 (May 11, 1928); see also J. WOOLSEY,
T. JONES, & C. CLARK, MEMORIAL OF JOSEPH PARKER KIRLIN, 1861-1927 (1928).
Kirlin was educated at the University of Virginia and Columbia Law School. He
probably reached the apogee of his legal prominence in the decade 1910-1920, when
he represented the White Star Line after the sinking of the Titanic, see The Titanic,
209 F. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); Cunard after the sinking of the Lusitania, see The
Lusitiana, 251 F. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1918); and the Guaranty Trust Company in The
Kronprinzessin Cecilie, see The Kronprinzessin Cecilie v. Guaranty Trust Co., 244
U.S. 12 (1917), and served as General Counsel for the Shipping Control Committee
during World War I.
89. Record at 13, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Record at 12-14, The
Lola, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
90. Record at 15, The Paquete Habana; Record at 14, The Lola.
91. Record at 15, The Paquete Habana; Record at 14, The Lola. American prize stat-
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Although the record of the argument and holding is quite sketchy,
the basic issues that would concern the Supreme Court had been aired
during the argument over this motion. The basic issues were: whether
the present state of international law exempted fishing vessels from capture; whether a United States court could take cognizance of international law in the absence of a treaty or statute; and whether the
exemption of fishing vessels was established in internationallaw.92
Thereafter, the vessels disappear. They were auctioned, apparently
in July or August of 1898, by United States Marshal John F. Horr. The
Paquete Habana brought $490 and the Lola $800. 93 On August 15,
1899, Kirlin filed appeals in both cases with the Supreme Court. 94 The
two cases were consolidated; only one set of briefs and arguments, and
one record, appear from that date forward.

B.

The Argument

Kirlin, in his appeal, made four assignments of error by the district
court. The first was a basic point of international law: The fishing vessels were not subject to condemnation as lawful prize. The second point
utes in 1898 had not changed a great deal in a century. The original statute of 1800,
Act of April 23, 1800, §§ 6-7,2 Stat. 45, overhauled during the Civil War, Act of
June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. 306, established a complex pyramid of fractional shares, in
which proportions officers and crew shared in the proceeds from the condemnation
and sale of prizes. The United States Treasury Department took half if the prize
was of inferior force to the captor, as in The Paquete Habana; if an American warship captured an enemy prize of superior force, the Treasury took nothing. F.
UPTON, THE LA W OF NATIONS AFFECTING COMMERCE DURING WAR 484 (1863).
In addition to the proceeds of sale, captors could in 1898 receive bounty or prize
money. These were statutory allotments from the Treasury, bounty being based
upon the number of enemy sailors and the superior/inferior force idea, and prize
money upon the value of the captured ship. Neither was involved in The Paquete
Habana, and both were abolished in 1899. Knauth, Prize Law Reconsidered, 46
COLUM. L. REV. 69, 70-71 (1946); see J. STORY, NOTES ON THE PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF PRIZE COURTS (F. Pratt ed. 1854).
92. Record at 15, The Paquete Habana; Record at 16, The Lola.
93. Record at 16, The Paquete Habana; Record at 14-15, The Lola. The fish were not
sold, there evidently being no market for them at Key West; instead they were eaten
by the crews of the smacks and revenue cutters or were thrown away.
94. Record at 20-22, The Paquete Habana; Record at 16-17, The Lola. It is reasonable
to inquire what could motivate an alien owner with only $490 at stake (in the case of
Justa Gaban) to pursue protracted and expensive litigation in the highest court of a
foreign nation. Although the value of money was much higher then, that alone does
not answer the question. There appear to be two reasons for pursuing these cases to
the Supreme Court. First, in capture without probable cause, the captors are liable
for damages, costs, and expenses. J. STORY, supra note 91, at 39-43. If it were held
that international law prohibited the capture of such vessels, the owners would recover substantially more than the auction price, particularly because there was argument over the valuation of the vessels at auction. See infra notes 199-210 and
accompanying text. Second, this was a test case for a great number of such vessels
captured during the war. This is apparent from the fact that Kirlin, in the second
Paquete Habana case, represented the claimants of 12 different vessels. 189 U.S.
453 (1903). Clearly, much more was at stake in an economic sense than two smacks
and some fish.
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was based on a statement made in President McKinley's proclamation of
April 26, 1898, that the war should be conducted in accordance with the
recent practice of nations, which Kirlin maintained did not include
seizure of fishing vessels. The third point was one that counsel for both
sides would address before the Supreme Court. Kirlin claimed the joint
resolution of April 20, 1898, had recognized Cuban independence; therefore, the fishing vessels were neutral, not enemy property. His final point
embraced a technicality of admiralty practice. Kirlin claimed the district
court had erroneously excluded evidence regarding the immunity of the
vessels. 95
The Court also raised sua sponte a jurisdictional issue that it asked
the parties to brief and argue. R.S. 695,96 a statute dating to the Civil
War, permitted direct appeal to the Supreme Court in a prize case if
$2,000 was involved or if the district court certified the question involved
in the case as one of general importance. Neither of these criteria was
met in The Paquete Habana. The Act of March 3, 1891,97 however,
which established the circuit courts of appeals, stated that direct appeals
could be taken to the Supreme Court from final decrees in prize cases.
The Act imposed a $1,000 jurisdictional limit for Supreme Court appeals
in "cases not hereinbefore made final."
On October 9, 1899, Assistant Attorney General Henry M. Hoyt,98
who argued the case for the United States, filed a brief on the issue of
jurisdiction. Hoyt contended that the $1,000 jurisdictional limit only applied to cases made final in the circuit courts of appeals. The Paquete
Habana had come from district court; thus the old $2,000 limit in R.S.
695 applied. Because $2,000 was not at stake in The Paquete Habana,
Hoyt argued that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction. 99
Hoyt also addressed two nonjurisdictional issues raised by the
Court. First, to the question of whether the owners of the vessels were
too wealthy to come within the class of "poor fishermen" for whom the
exemption was available (a query which assumed the existence of some
sort of exemption), Hoyt replied that economic status would not affect
immunity; however, Hoyt argued that other facts identified the owners as
members of the ruling Spanish population-not the Cuban insurgentsand that further proof of the owners' adherence to the Cuban cause was
improper. loo This argument adverted to Kirlin's allegation that the own95.
96.
97.
98.

Record at 20-21, The Paquete Habana; Record at 16-17, The Lola.
Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 174, § 11, 13 Stat. 310 (codified at R.S. § 695 (1878».
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
Henry Hoyt (1856-1910) was born in Pennsylvania, the son of a Governor of that
state. Educated at Yale and the University of Pennsylvania Law School, he served
as Assistant Attorney General from 1897-1903, and Solicitor General from 1903-09.
MARQUIS -WHO'S WHO, WHO WAS WHO IN AMERICA, 1897-1942 at 599; New
York Times, Nov. 21, 1910, Obituary at 9.
99. Brief for United States on The Question of Jurisdiction at 1-5, The Paquete
Habana.
100. Id. at 6-7.
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ers were neutrals. Second, in response to the question of whether a
French cruiser, after 1778, could have made a valid prize of an American
vessel, Hoyt noted that France had entered the Revolutionary War on
the American side in 1778. Therefore, a French cruiser could not have
made a valid prize of an American vessel, because the United States had
a flag and belligerent rights that were recognized by France. 101 A French
cruiser, however, could have made a valid prize of an American vessel
that was flying a British flag, because the American vessel would have
been deemed a Tory ship and thus an enemy.102 Hoyt argued that the
circumstances of the captures at issue in The Paquete Habana were
analogous to the hypothetical capture by a French cruiser of an American vessel sailing under a Tory flag. Neither the Paquete Habana nor the
Lola flew the Cuban flag; 103 instead, both vessels regularly sailed under
the Spanish flag. 104 Therefore, the indicia of the vessels showed their
enemy character. lOS
The position taken by the United States was that Cubans, by virtue
of their status as Spanish subjects, were alien enemies and thus their vessels were good prizes unless they openly adhered to the Cuban cause. 106
The crews of vessels, out of fear of the Spanish, or for other reasons, had
not done so. Therefore, they were enemies, and no further evidence
should be allowed to prove otherwise.
In his brief, Kirlin advanced four lines of argument. First, he contended that international law did not sanction the capture and condemnation of boats exclusively engaged in coastal fishing. 107 He cited
President McKinley's April 26, 1898, proclamation,IOS including its adherence to the Declaration of Paris, as evidence that the United States
intended to follow the principles of modern international law in waging
the war. Although there were few judicial decisions and no American
statutes or treaties dealing with the immunity of coastal fishing vessels,
Kirlin argued that the actions of governments and the almost uniform
opinions of publicists provided sufficient evidence that such immunity
existed as a rule of international law. Kirlin cited Lord Phillimore in
The Queen v. Keyn 109 for the proposition that the opinions of jurists are
good evidence of what is international law. Kirlin also quoted Froissart's
Chronicles I 10 and Henry IV's Order of 1406, III granting his protection to
fishermen, as evidence of the rule's ancient origins. Kirlin included an
101. Id. at 7.
102.Id.
103. Id. at 7.
104. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 678 (1900).
105. Brief for United States on The Question of Jurisdiction at 8, The Paquete Habana.
106. Id. at 5-6.
107. Brief for Appellants at 7, The Paquete Habana.
108.Id.
109. 2 Ex. D. 63, 68-70 (1876).
110. 3 J. FROISSART, FROISSART'S CHRONIQUES 41 (1824).
Ill. See 8 T. RYMER, RYMER'S FOEDERA 451 (1406).
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examination of the manner in which the rule had been treated during the
nineteenth century. The only adverse English precedent, The Young Jacob and Johanna,112 was distinguished as involving spying by fishing
boats; moreover, English Orders in Council of 1806 subsequently had
restored the immunity. I 13 He cited the French case La Nostra Segnora
de fa Piedad l14 to present the continental opinion that immunity for
coastal fishing vessels was a binding rule of international law. In addition, Kirlin cited many nineteenth century writers on international law in
order to show a consensus that the rule existed and gave examples of
French actions in the Crimean and Franco-Prussian Wars and Japanese
actions in the Sino-Japanese War as evidence of recent practice. I 15 He
asserted that an exemption for fishing boats was allowed by the United
States during the Mexican War. Kirlin also made the assertion that, prior
to Secretary Long's April 30, 1898, letter to Rear Admiral Sampson, I 16
instructions had been given not to harm fishing boats. Kirlin admitted,
however, that he had no proof of this, and in view of the numerous captures at the outbreak of the war, the assertion seems somewhat dubious.
Finally, Kirlin pointed out that the officers and crews of the vessels
lacked knowledge of the blockade and the war and thus could not have
intended to participate in the hostilities or aid the enemy.1I7
Second, Kirlin argued that the Cubans had been recognized by Congress and, therefore, they should have been treated either as neutrals or
as allies. This argument, premised on language contained in the joint
resolution, stated that the courts had no power to make determinations
of the existence of states of war, belligerency, independence, and the like;
these were political questions upon which the courts must defer to the
judgment of the political branches. I IS In Kirlin's words, "[t]he recognition of the freedom and independence of a whole people must of necessity
regard them as a state for all purposes of war, and the use of the expression the 'people of Cuba' in the joint resolution of Congress must certainly have had that effect." I 19 Kirlin also emphasized that the owners
and mariners of the ships in question were domiciled in Cuba and hence
were "Cubans" within the meaning of the joint resolution. 120 In making
this argument, however, Kirlin completely ignored the principle, established in the United States at the time of Washington's presidency, that
recognition of a foreign state or government is the exclusive prerogative
112. 1 C. Rob. Adm. 20 (1798).
113. Brief for Appellants at 12-13, The Paquete Habana.
114. 2 F. DECUSSY, CAUSES CELEBRES DU DROIT MARITIME 166 (1856).
115. See generally Brief for Appellants at 16-33, The Paquete Habana.
116. Letter from Secretary Long to Rear Admiral Sampson, supra note 74.
117. Brief for Appellants at 35, The Paquete Habana.
118. [d. at 37.
119. [d. at 35.
120. [d. at 48-49.

1985]

Coastal Fishing Vessel Immunity

21

of the executive. 121 Because it was an action of Congress, the joint resolution could have no effect upon American recognition of Cuba. Only
President McKinley could receive envoys and recognize governments,
and he had not done so with Cuba. The insulting demands in the joint
resolution could provoke war, but they could not recognize Cuba. The
government, possibly for political reasons, did not use the doctrine of
exclusive executive perogative to refute Kirlin's argument; instead, all
parties focused on issues of recognition/nonrecognition and enemy versus ally or neutral status. 122
Kirlin's third argument addressed the owners' statuses as enemy or
nonenemy in the Cuban insurrection. 123 The mere operation of the fishing boats under the Spanish flag did not raise a presumption of hostility,
he argued; instead, all situational factors such as ownership, cargo, and
circumstances, had to be considered. 124 There was no requirement that
the mariners invite Spanish confiscation by flying the insurgent Cuban
flag. Because the crew had no knowledge that war had broken out and
therefore no hostile intent, the presence of the Spanish flag was not sufficient to give the ships a hostile character. 125 Moreover, prize practice at
the outbreak of war allowed neutrals or friends to communicate with
their vessels and remove the enemy flag, without condemnation, as long
as laches was not present. 126 Finally, he reiterated that further proof of
the owners' Cuban sentiments should be allowed.127
Kirlin's fourth argument concerned the question of damages. Citing
121. National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 358 (1955);
see United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-21 (1936).
122. McKinley had signed the joint resolution on April 20, 1898. Although it is true that
approved joint resolutions have the force and effect of law, see International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers v. Washington Terminal Co., 473 F.2d 1156, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 906 (1973), it is quite a different matter to say that the April
20, 1900, joint resolution recognized Cuba. Its terms were hortatory, as Hoyt was
to point out, and the joint resolution was essentially a Congressional action ratified
by a President who had given Congress carte blanche. Brief for the United States at
6, The Paquete Habana. More importantly, following the joint resolution, McKinley took no action consonant with recognition of Cuban independence. He did not
send or receive envoys, or deal with a Cuban government; instead, the island simply
exchanged an inefficient Spanish military occupation for a more efficient American
one. Prior to the joint resolution, the United States had not recognized the Cubans
as belligerents. See The Three Friends, 166 U.S. I (1897). Recognition of such a
status, however, would not, of itself, have implied any recognition of a Cuban state.
See Beale, The Recognition of Cuban Belligerency, 9 HARV. L. REV. 406, 406-07
(1896). In fact, recognition of Cuba by the United States and other nations did not
take place until 1902, following arrangements which allowed American intervention
in Cuban affairs to protect American interests. PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1902, at 320-26 (1903).
123. Brief for Appellants at 49-50, The Paquete Habana.
124. !d. at 49.
125. /d. at 50.
126. /d. at 52-55 (citing the Civil War cases of The William Bagaley, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)
377 (I866) and The Grey Jacket, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 342 (I866».
127. Brief for Appellants at 55, The Paquete Habana.
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Justice Story, he argued that capture was at the captors' peril. 128 If there
are no just grounds for capture, damages may be assessed against the
captor. In The Paquete Habana, there was no probable cause for capture
because it was widely known that fishing vessels were exempt; accordingly, the captures were premature, because they had preceded notice of
the existence of war (this was not the case in The Lola) and the ships'
papers showed that the owners were Cubans.129 Emphasizing the hardship that the captures had imposed on the owners of small vessels, Kirlin
stated that the "fullest reparation must be made."130
Kirlin's brief was a creditable performance. He did an excellent job
of searching legal precedent and literature to show the status of the exemption in international law. Although there were serious problems
with his arguments based upon Cuban "nationality," Kirlin was certainly
very thorough. As an experienced advocate in an uncertain area of law,
he made every reasonable argument for his clients.
The government's brief on the merits, filed by Hoyt, raised two principal issues: whether, as a matter of general law, fishing vessels were
exempt from capture; and whether the Cuban owners were entitled to the
rights and privileges of neutrals. \31 Hoyt began with his strongest argument - that the crews were neither allies nor neutrals. Emphasizing
that there was no proof the owners or the crews were in sympathy with
the Cuban insurgents, he argued that they could not therefore be belligerent allies. Nor could they be neutrals, because the taking of provisions
into Havana was not a neutral act.
Hoyt also attacked Kirlin's interpretation of the language of the
joint resolution as providing for recognition of Cuba. Although Hoyt did
not make the point that Congress qua Congress was powerless to recognize Cuba, he did acknowledge its presumptuous nature: how could a
declaration of the American Congress, "one part of which certainly was
not in strict accordance with the existing fact, terminate violently and
abruptly the previous national ties of another people over whom we possessed no rights and exercised no control[?]"132 Hoyt argued that Congress had neither recognized Cuba nor intended to do so. He argued that
the joint resolution was a demand on Spain and a statement of the belief
that Cuba "ought to be" free and independent. It followed that the status of the Cuban owners as Spanish subjects was unchanged in international law by the joint resolution. 133
This argument was logical and far more in accord with American
practice than was Kirlin's insistence that Congress had recognized Cuba.
By arguing that Congress had not intended to recognize Cuba, Hoyt
128. The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818).
129. Brief for Appellants at 58-59, The Paquete Habana.
130. [d. at 59.
131. Brief for the United States at 5, The Paquete Habana.
132. [d. at 6.
133. [d.
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achieved two objectives. First, he avoided branding Congress with attempting an unconstitutional act and avoided criticism, as a McKinley
administration official, of congressional action the administration had invited the previous year. Second, he refuted the contention that the
Cubans, who were not recognized by the Executive, were neutrals or
allies.
Hoyt cited a number of Civil War cases, notably the Prize Cases 134
and Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, \35 for the proposition that all persons who
reside in enemy territory and do not remove themselves on the outbreak
of war are enemies and will be treated as such, without inquiries into
individual sentiments. Because Cuba was not independent, it continued
to be Spanish and, therefore, enemy territory. Hence, the Cuban owners
of the vessels were alien enemies. 136 Finally, Hoyt argued that the language of President McKinley's April 26, 1898, proclamation did not
change United States policy; references in the proclamation to modern
practice in international law related to the specific subjects that followed,
the "days of grace" and the Declaration of Paris. I37
Hoyt's second contention addressed the primary question of
whether an exemption for fishing vessels existed in international law. He
began by admitting that some exemption existed. He posited that the
exemption existed for humanitarian reasons, or because of the insignificance of the property involved.138 Hence, the fishing vessels at issue did
not fall within the ambit of the exception because they were relatively
large vessels capable of remaining at sea for some time. Moreover, Hoyt
argued that when two warring nations are essentially contiguous, as are
Britain and France, such small boats will frequently be in the area of
operations, and humanity would dictate an exemption. When the combatants are widely separated, however, practical considerations stand in
the way of taking such small vessels in for adjudication. 139 Because the
United States and Cuba are essentially contiguous, and a prize court located in Key West was functioning, it is difficult to see what Hoyt hoped
to achieve with these contentions.
Hoyt then contrasted continental practice, which regarded the exemption as "tolerably well-fixed," with English practice, which regarded
the exemption as discretionary and requiring executive or treaty action.140 Hoyt argued the United States followed the English practice and
no ordinance or treaty existed to bind the United States to a practice that
exempted fishing vessels from capture. Returning to the question of vessel size, Hoyt claimed that the vessels were too large to come within the
134. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
135. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 404 (1865).
136. Brief for the United States at 6-9, The Paquete Habana.
137. Id. at 9.
138. Id. at 9-10.
139.Id.
140. Id. at 11.

24

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 15

exemption, and he argued that the development of deep-sea fishing had
negated the reason for the exemption. 141 This curious argument ignored
not only the obvious existence of the coastal fishermen whose status was
at issue, but also Kirlin's assertion that there was a growing international
consensus in favor of the exemption. 142
Hoyt cited The Young Jacob and Johanna 143 to emphasize the English view that the exemption was one of comity only, which required
positive executive action for its implementation. He attempted to refute
Kirlin's extensive list of jurists and publicists who supported the rule by
portraying them as mere theorists:
[I]t must be remembered that the writers on international
law - and especially the Continental writers on international
law - are far in advance of legislation, as well as of decisions of
the courts; that while the English law writers are more sober in
their statements, and have greater regard for the rights of belligerents, even they do not express the English law as it is, but
rather as they conceive it ought to be; and that in looking to
any foreign rule for our guidance, we properly regard, where
our own practice and law are silent on the question, the decisions of the English courts, and not the speculations of writers
on international law, either English or Continental. 144
This statement, betraying a masked discomfort with any "law" that
was not positive legislation, exhibited a common lawyer's puzzlement
over the place of the writings of jurists and publicists in the international
law system. More immediately it showed a basic misunderstanding of
Kirlin's strategy. Kirlin had not attempted to ventilate advanced academic opinion; instead, he had attempted to show, through a variety of
sources, what the developing international law actually was.
Hoyt again digressed on the differences between the "hypothetical"
views of writers and the actual law and the difference between the English and French approaches. He argued that there were no limits on the
exemption as to the size of the ship and crew, the distance from the shore
of the vessel, and the length of time the ship could stay at sea.
After citing other writers on the existence of the exemption and international adherence to it, Hoyt then readdressed the question of the
Cubans' status and reiterated the arguments he had made earlier in the
brief about the intent and effect of the joint resolution. In retrospect, one
statement made in this part of the brief is particulary noteworthy.
Although it did not make any new legal argument, the statement foretold, to some degree, the complications associated with future American
involvement in foreign insurrections:
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 15-16.
1 C. Rob. Adm. 20 (1798).
Brief for the United States at 16, The Paquete Habana.

1985]

Coastal Fishing Vessel Immunity

25

The belligerency of the Cubans was never recognized unless by the resolution of April 20; that resolution did recognize
their independence by stating that the Cubans were and ought
to be free and independent, a somewhat inconsistent statement
as applied to another people who might not be willing to fight
for their independence as a people . . . . Did such a recognition of independence under these circumstances make the Cuban people a State? There is not yet a Cuban State in the list of
nations, and we are still necessarily carrying on the government
of that island by a military administration. 145
After this perceptive sally, Hoyt muddied the waters and spent some
of the force of his argument by arguing that the joint resolution was a
political act which affected only the Cubans' political status, not the private rights involved in prize matters. 146 This contradicted his earlier and
more logical argument that the resolution had no political effect at all; it
also ignored the fact that by virtue of its status as a branch of public
international law, prize law could not be divorced from politics and public affairs. Finally, he concluded his brief with an indirect attack upon
Kirlin's damages argument, maintaining that the Navy had acted in
complete good faith in making the captures. 147
The government's brief was a mixed effort. Hoyt in the earlier sections of the brief brilliantly refuted Kirlin's contentions regarding the
Cubans' nationality and the effect of the joint resolution. When addressing the question of whether the exemption from capture was part of customary international law, however, Hoyt's arguments were diffuse,
evasive, ill-organized, and based on misunderstandings of both customary international law and the strategy Kirlin was pursuing through his
citation of authority.
The Supreme Court heard oral argument in The Paquete Habana on
145. [d. at 28.
146. [d.
147. [d. at 32-33. Two other briefs were filed prior to the oral argument by counsel who
did not participate in the argument. Joseph K. McCammon and James H. Hayden
filed a brief that emphasized the "expediency and humanity" interests underlying
the exemption, and argued that the Paquete Habana and Lola were "staunch, seaworthy" vessels capable of staying out for weeks. Brieffor Captors, Nov. 7, 1899,
The Paquete Habana. The brief went on to argue that the owners of the vessels did
not use them for personal livelihood; instead, the vessels were chartered out as investments. Hence, the owners hardly came within the class of poor fishermen that
the rule was meant to benefit. The brief emphasized the difference between English
and continental practice, averring that the European writers were of no value as
authorities to an American court. [d. at 5-6. The brief then reiterated Hoyt's arguments that the Cuban crew members were enemies, placing particular emphasis
upon their remaining in Havana throughout the insurrection, and argued that further proofs were not warranted because there were no questions of fact in the case.
[d. at 9-11. George A. King and William B. King filed a brief for certain captors
who were not otherwise identified. This brief reiterated the arguments that domicile
controlled status, and therefore the Cuban owners were alien enemies. Brief for
Certain Captors, Nov. 7, 1899, at 1-7, The Paquete Habana.
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November 7-8, 1899. Although there is no account of the argument, one
issue which clearly concerned the Court was Kirlin's assertion that there
was American precedent from the Mexican War for the exemption of
fishing boats. This is apparent because on November 11, 1899, Hoyt filed
a "Statement" on the subject. 148 This curious document began with the
assertion that no American writer confirmed the exemption, and that the
Treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo,149 which had ended the Mexican War in
1848, operated prospectively only and protected "persons, not their
property." Hoyt admitted, however, that a search of formerly confidential Navy correspondence had revealed a letter of May 14, 1846, from
Commander Conner of the Home Squadron, stating that Mexican
coastal fishermen would not be molested. 150 The letter had been favorably endorsed on June 10, 1846, by the historian George Bancroft, then
serving as Secretary of the Navy.151 This revelation, which confirmed
Kirlin's argument and was an important precedent, was somewhat embarrassing to the government. Hoyt tried to minimize the damage by
pointing out that later in the war Commodore Stockton had ordered the
Navy to capture all Mexican vessels off the coast of California. Stockton's action, as opposed to that of Connor, however, had not received
executive approval. Hoyt reiterated the English view that positive executive action was necessary for the exemption to apply, and pointed out
that regardless of Commander Conner's correspondence, the Executive
had taken no such action to trigger the exemption in the Spanish-American War. 152 Hoyt clearly was surprised by the uncovering of this precedent, and his Statement seems both hastily written and contradictory.
Kirlin also filed a supplemental brief on November 13, 1899. 153 In it
he addressed the jurisdictional issue, arguing that the 1891 Circuit Court
of Appeals Act had repealed the $2,000 jurisdictional limit of R.S.
695,154 and, consequently, direct appeals could now be taken to the
Supreme Court from final decrees in prize cases, regardless of the
amounts at issue. Also, he addressed the Cuban nationality issue, arguing
in a rather circular manner that the owners were "Cubans" because they
lived in Cuba, that the joint resolution brought them within its ambit,
and that there was no need to prove the owners had sympathized with
the insurgents because the language of the joint resolution specifically
distinguished Cubans from Spaniards. Finally, he reminded the Court
that the government itself had confirmed the existence of American pre148. Statement on Behalf of the United States Relative to Exemption Allowed to Fishing
Vessels in the Mexican War at 1-4, The Paquete Habana.
149. Treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922, T.S. No. 207.
150. Statement on Behalf of the United States Relative to Exemption Allowed to Fishing
Vessels in the Mexican War at 1-4, The Paquete Habana.
151. Id. at 4.
152. Id. at 5.
153. Supplemental Brief for Appellants, Nov. 13, 1899, The Paquete Habana.
154. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 174, § 11, 13 Stat. 310 (codified at R.S. § 695 (1878»; see
also supra text accompanying note 95.
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cedent, during the Mexican War, for the exemption. ISS Although none of
these arguments, other than the jurisdictional argument, were new, Kirlin did respond effectively to the criticisms leveled by Hoyt concerning
his use of foreign writers as evidence of the development of international
law:
It is not necessary that the claimant should be able to cite
an adjudicated case holding that the principle contended for is
a rule of international law . . . . In a certain sense, there is no
positive sanction for the rules of international law as there is for
the principles of municipal law. Long observance of a rule or
custom, its embodiment in treaties, its recognition in the standard text books on international law, and the justice, equity,
and convenience of a principle establish it as a rule which the
Court . . . may recognize and enforce. If this were not so,
there could be no advancement in the principles of internationallaw except by the great Conference of the Powers and by
the most formal public Conventions; and these, we know are by
no means the sources from which such principles are
derived. 156

When the Justices voted, Chief Justice Melville W. Fuller and the
senior Associate Justice, John Marshall Harlan, were in the minority. It
thus fell to the senior Associate Justice in the majority, Horace Gray, to
assign the writing of the majority opinion. Gray took the opinion
himself. 157
C.

The Opinion

Justice Gray's contemporaries stressed his qualities of enormous
memory and erudition, his faculty for lengthy, thorough research, and
his tendency toward extensive written exposition.158 He was not known
for legal innovation, although, as The Paquete Habana would show, Justice Gray was anything but insensible to the development of law on a
historical basis.ls9 The most salient feature of his judicial behavior, one
of particular importance to The Paquete Habana, was his inclination to
155. Supplemental Brief for Appellants, Nov. 13, 1899, at 3-7, The Paquete Habana.
156. Id. at 8-9.
157. Justi<.:e Gray was educated at Harvard, earning an A.B. in 1845 and an LL.B. in
1849. He was admitted to the bar in 1851, and in 1854 be<.:ame Reporter of the State
Supreme Judicial Court. a position he held until 1860. In 1864. he was appointed an
Asso<.:iate Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court. and in 1873, Chief Justice. He
remained on the state court until 1881. when he was appointed an Associate Justi<.:e
of the United States Supreme Court. Lowell. Biographical Note OIl Horace Gray 39
"ROC. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 627, 627-28 (1904).
158. Id. at 628, 632; see also George F. Hoar in 2 MEMORIALS OF THE JUSTICES OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 270 (R. Jacobs ed. 1981) [hereinafter
dted as MEMORIALS].
159. William A. Maury in MEMORIALS, supra note 158, at 304.
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analyze matters in the light of historical development. A recent scholar
has written:
A member of the most scholarly line on the Court - one
that began with Cushing and ultimately ran through Story,
Holmes, Cardozo, and Frankfurter - Gray was also the most
history-centered, his reasoning to conclusions taking place
more through the historical or chronological process than did
that of any other member of the high court. What made Gray
unique was that he was not only a legal historian observing
what others did; he was a legal historian on the bench. l60
A famous contemporary of his, Henry Cabot Lodge, said much the same
thing: "He was not content with merely stating the point at issue, but in
some of the decisions we find a review of the entire history of the principles involved, which falls little short of a treatise on the whole
subject." 161
With his predisposition to view matters historically, it is not surprising that Justice Gray, when given the opportunity to assign the majority
opinion in The Paquete Habana, chose to write the opinion himself. The
principal question - whether the exemption for coastal fishing vessels
was part of customary international law - was essentially an historical
one. Kirlin's brief, with its numerous citations to authority dating as far
back as the fourteenth century, must have particularly appealed to him.
Justice Gray's achievement in writing The Paquete Habana opinion
must be accounted a tour de force of judicial effort. The case was argued
on November 7-8, 1899, and the principal briefs were filed at the same
time. Notwithstanding the intervention of the Christmas holidays,
Gray's opinion, which required prodigious research, was written, circulated, approved, and ready for announcement two months later on January 8, 1900.
The announcement of the decision and the reading of the opinions in
The Paquete Habana was the main order of business on January 8,
1900. 162 After stating the facts of the captures and condemnations, Gray
addressed the jurisdictional question that the Court had raised sua
sponte. The Court rejected the government's contention that there was
no jurisdiction because the $2,000 limit in R.S. 695 163 was not met and
held that the Circuit Courts of Appeals Act of 1891 164 had made the
nature of the case, not the amount involved, the relevant criterion for
160. Spector, Legal Historian on the United States Supreme Court: Justice Horace Gray.
Jr.. and the Historical Method, 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 181,181 (l968); see also S.
Mitchell, Mr. Justice Horace Gray (l962) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Wisconsin).
161. Henry Cabot Lodge in MEMORIALS, supra note 158, at 285.
162. U.S. Supreme Court, Journal of the Supreme Court of the United States, October
Term, 1899, at 77 (19OO).
163. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 174, § 11, 13 Stat. 306, 310 (codified at R.S. § 695 (1878}).
164. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.

1985]

Coastal Fishing Vessel Immunity

29

appellate jurisdiction. The Act, by providing for direct appeal of final
decrees in prize without mention of amount, had sub silentio repealed the
jurisdictional amount of R.S. 695; the $1,000 limit in the 1891 Circuit
Court of Appeals Act applied only to certain cases which had been
before a court of appeals. It followed that the Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction over The Paquete Habana. 165
After disposing of this threshold issue, Justice Gray focused upon
the merits and phrased the issue as "whether, upon the facts appearing in
these records, the fishing smacks were subject to capture . . . . "166 He
began by positing the basic proposition that "[b]y an ancient usage
among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening
into a rule of international law, coast fishing vessels, pursuing their vocation of catching and bringing in fresh fish, have been recognized as exempt, with their cargoes and crews, from capture as prize of war."167
Justice Gray provided an elaborate and comprehensive historical examination of this exception for coast fishermen. He analyzed decrees of
Henry IV of England in the fifteenth century, and French, English, and
Dutch examples of recognition of the exemption prior to American independence. 168 He cited the U.S.-Prussian treaty of 1785,169 with its famous article exempting "scholars of every faculty, cultivators of the
earth, artisans, manufacturers, and fishermen," from molestation in time
of war, as an early American recognition of the principle pO
Justice Gray then turned to what he termed "the only serious interruptions . . . of the general recognition of the exemption,"171 which occurred during the Napoleonic Wars. After detailing the chronology of
events, he came to The Young Jacob and Johanna, 172 a case the government had relied heavily upon in The Paquete Habana for the proposition
that positive executive action was needed to establish the exemption as
binding.173 Justice Gray distinguished The Young Jacob and Johanna
from the present case on two grounds. First, The Young Jacob and Johanna was a response to a 1798 Order in Council l74 directing the taking
of fishing vessels, which was promulgated in response to French use of
such vessels in war. Second, the record in The Young Jacob and Johanna
contained strong evidence of fraud.
Recognizing the growth and dynamism of international law, Justice
165. 175 U.S. 677, 680-86 (1900).
166. [d. at 686.
167. [d.
168. [d. at 686-90.
169. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Sept. 10, 1785, United States-Prussia, art. XXII, 8
Stat. 84, T.S. No. 292 (1785).
170. 175 U.S. 677, 690-91.
171. !d. at 691.
172. 1 C. Rob. Adm. 20 (1798).
173. Brief for the United States at II, The Paquete Habana.
174. Order of Jan. 24, 1798, in 2 ORTOLAN 53.
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Gray refuted the government's assertion that there could be no exemption without positive executive action and resolved the comity argument:
The opinion begins by admitting the known custom in former wars not to capture such vessels; adding, however, "but
this was a rule of comity only, and not of legal decision." Assuming the phrase "legal decision" . . . as equivalent to "judicial decision," it is true that, so far as appears, there had been
no such decision on the point in England. The word "comity"
was apparently used by Lord Stowell as synonymous with courtesy or goodwill. But the period of a hundred years which has
since elapsed is amply sufficient to have enabled what originally
may have rested in custom or comity. . . to grow, by the general
assent of civilized nations, into a settled rule of international
law. 175
Justice Gray also provided an exhaustive examination of nineteenth century writings and practice to illustrate that the "growth" of which he had
written had in fact taken place. Beginning with the British action of
1806, which restored the ancient exception, Justice Gray canvassed the
American example in the Mexican War, French custom, English conduct
in the Crimea, and the policy followed by Japan during its war with
China. 176
Justice Gray followed his discussion of actual practice with an examination of the writings of contemporary jurists. He began this segment of the opinion with a statement that is perhaps the most often-cited
passage from The Paquete Habana:

International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts ofjustice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presentedfor their determination. For this purpose, where there
is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages
of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of
jurists and commentators. . . . Such works are resorted to by
judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence
of what the law really is.l77
This was a clear rebuff to the government's argument that the Court
should reject the "speculations" of theorists because they were not acceptable sources of law.17X Justice Gray understood not only the dynamic nature of international custom, but the place of jurists and
commentators in the civil and international law systems. His examina175.
176.
177.
178.

175 U.S. 677, 694 (emphasis added).
[d. at 694-700.
[d. at 700 (emphasis added).
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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tion of the contemporary sources was as thorough as his historical research and included American, French, Argentine, German, English,
Dutch, Austrian, Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian writers. I 79 His conclusion exhibited this understanding:
[A]t the present day, by the general consent of the civilized
nations of the world, and independently of any express treaty or
other public act, it is an established rule of international law,
founded on considerations of humanity. . . and of the mutual
convenience of belligerent states, that coast fishing vessels, with
their implements and supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed and
honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt from capture as prize of war.180
The exemption was not a universal one; it did not apply if the vessels
engaged in warfare, or if naval operations created a state of military necessity "to which all private interests must give way."181 Nor did it apply to deep-sea fishing vessels taking fish that were not brought fresh to
market. Within its limits, however, it was an effective and binding rule of
internationallaw. 182
Justice Gray refuted the proposition that positive executive action
was required to recognize the exemption. He cited Justice Marshall's
opinion in Brown v. United States,183 which relied on the modern usage of
nations, I 84 and Justice Strong's statement in The Scotia I 85 that "it is recognition of the historical fact that by common consent of mankind these
rules have been acquiesced in as of general obligation. . . . Foreign
municipal laws must indeed be proved as facts, but it is not so with the
law of nations." I 86
Justice Gray closed his opinion by reviewing President McKinley's
April 26, 1898, proclamation and the correspondence between Rear Admiral Sampson and Secretary Long. 187 Justice Gray interpreted the preamble of the proclamation as evidence of American intent to conduct the
blockade in compliance with international law. He interpreted Rear Admiral Sampson's dispatch as evidence of his belief that, absent an express
order to the contrary, coastal fishermen were not subject to arrest. Providing Secretary Long's reply with a more lenient interpretation than it
perhaps deserved, Justice Gray viewed it as forbidding the blockade
squadron from interfering with coastal fishing vessels unless the vessels
179.
ISO.
lSI.
IS2.
IS3.
IS4.
ISS.
IS6.
IS7.

175 U.S. 677, 700-07.
/d. at 70S.
[d.
[d.
12 U.S. (S Cranch) 110 (1S14).
[d. at 123, 125.
SI U.S. (14 Wall.) 170 (1S72).
[d. at ISS.
See supra notes 72, 74 and accompanying text.
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were likely to aid the enemy. 188
Justice Gray emphasized the facts of the case, pointing out that the
Paquete Habana and the Lola were small, unarmed vessels engaged in
coastal fishing. The vessels were not aiding the enemy or trying to run
the blockade. Moreover, the crews were working for a share of the
cargo; thus, neither vessel was a "commercial adventure." Therefore,
Justice Gray concluded that the vessels came within the exemption provided by international law. The decree of the district court was reversed,
arid the Court ordered the proceeds of the sales restored to the claimants,
with damages and costS.189
Chief Justice Fuller dissented. He was joined in his opinion by John
Marshall Harlan and Joseph McKenna, the senior and junior Associate
Justices. Chief Justice Fuller refused to accept Justice Gray's argument
that a rule of international law, in the absence of executive or legislative
action, could limit American naval activity. Chief Justice Fuller cited
Brown v. United States 190 to support his proposition that some form of
executive or legislative action was a necessary precursor to limitation of
naval activity by a rule of international law. He noted that the SampsonLong correspondence "was entirely consistent with the validity of the
captures," and concluded that the captures were valid because "it is impossible to concede that the Admiral ratified these captures in disregard
of established international law."191 Chief Justice Fuller criticized the
exemption for containing numerous exceptions and interfering with captures directed or ratified by the officer in command. He stated that, even
if the rule existed, the Paquete Habana and the Lola were large and essentially commercial in nature, and, therefore, should not come within
the ambit of the rule. After a few examples of contemporary practice
and citations from treatises which did not treat the rule as established,
Chief Justice Fuller attacked the "speculations and repetitions"l92 of the
jurists cited by Justice Gray: "Their lucubrations may be persuasive, but
not authoritative."193 He summarized his opinion by stating that the Executive possessed the power to grant such exemptions, and in the absence
of executive action, there was no exemption. 194

D.

Analysis of Opinion

Three salient points can be made with regard to Justice Gray's opinion. The first is that the opinion is an outstanding historical accomplishment. Although Kirlin had cited numerous historical sources in his
188. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 712-13 (1900). See supra note 75 for the effect
of Navy policy.
189. 175 U.S. 677, 714.
190.12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
191. 175 U.S. 677,717.
192. /d. at 720.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 718-21.
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brief, Justice Gray ranged far beyond Kirlin's citations, relying on an
enormous volume of research to construct a short treatise on the subject.
As one writer has commented:
Paquete Habana was a profound study in the modern law
of maritime prizes. Few decisions in the history of the United
States Supreme Court before or since present so vast a diversity
of sources in support of an opinion. Gray seemed to creep into
the most forlorn recesses of international law . . . . [His]
amazing historical equipment included not merely legal material but treaties and diplomatic correspondence as well
195

Henry Cabot Lodge later called the opinion "very remarkable . .
The whole history of fishing vessels as subjects of prize in war was set
forth."I96 The thoroughness with which Justice Gray set about his historical task was indeed astonishing. It is not surprising that there were
no concurring opinions on the issue of the exemption; Justice Gray had
exhausted the subject.
Second, Justice Gray's opinion relied entirely on the international
law exemption argument made by Kirlin. He did not mention the arguments concerning the effect of the joint resolution on Cuba, the nationality of the owners, or the owners' allegiance to Spain, to which the parties
had devoted much of their briefs. Because Justice Gray did not address
these points, it was unnecessary for him to delve into the procedural
questions raised by Kirlin and argued by both parties. Except for his
treatment of the threshold question of jurisdiction, Justice Gray's entire
opinion had one focus: proof that an exemption for coastal fishing vessels existed as a rule of international law.
Third, Justice Gray, although a nineteenth century conservative,
was receptive to the potential for development of international law.
Much of his opinion was devoted to showing the development of an international consensus for the exemption at issue. 197 Justice Gray's predilection for historical research clearly furnished him with an appreciation
for continental writers and legal systems that was not shared by much of
the American bar.
Chief Justice Fuller's dissent betrays a certain distrust of foreign innovations in the law and a reluctance to believe that the United States
would violate international law in its warmaking. The Chief Justice was
hampered by the majority's agreement to base the decision only upon the
international law issue of exemption for coastal fishing vessels. Had Justice Gray dealt with the Cuban nationality issue, Chief Justice Fuller
would have had more persuasive arguments at his disposal.
195. Spector, supra note 160, at 206.
196. Henry Cabot Lodge in MEMORIALS, supra note 158, at 285.
197. See 175 U.S. 677, 686·712.

34

V.

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 15

REACTION AND LAWMAKING, 1900 - 1907

Following the announcement of the judgment on January 8, 1900,
Hoyt filed a motion urging the Court to prohibit recovery of punitive
damages. He argued that the captures were made in good faith and that
the status of the exemption was not clear, stressing that the important
Mexican War precedent had been hidden in obscure records. 198 On January 22, 1900, Kirlin filed a brief in opposition to Hoyt's motion, arguing
that the matter was res judicata, the motion was premature, and the proceeds of the prize sale were likely less than the vessels' actual values. 199
On January 29, 1900, the Court granted Hoyt's motion and modified the
decree to state that only compensatory damages should be awarded. 2°O
The case was remanded to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, and a commissioner was appointed to take
testimony and determine the values of the vessels. An interesting result
of this testimony was an indication that the vessels may actually have
been more commercial than appeared in the original case. Jose Pasos, a
brother of the captain of the Paquete Habana, testified that he, the captain, and a third brother had owned half of the Paquete Habana - Justa
Galban owning the other half. He also testified that this investment
earned them an eighteen to twenty percent return on capital per year,
and that the ship was worth $4,500 in gold. 201 Jose Pasos's testimony
directly contradicted his brother's earlier statement that neither brother
had an interest in the vessel. Severo Gonzales, owner of the Lola, testified that he earned a twenty-two percent return from the vessel per yeal
and that it was worth $5,000 in gold. 202 Such testimony, assuming it
were true, would not have undercut Justice Gray's findings regarding the
existence of an exemption in international law. Had the testimony been
in the record, however, it might have led to a different outcome for the
Paquete Habana and the Lola, with the Court holding that they did not
come within the exemption because of their commercial nature. Justice
Gray relied on the noncommercial status of the vessels to fit them within
the exemption;203 it is possible that he, and the majority, might have
viewed the vessels differently if they had not appeared in this guise.
This is speculation, however, and the fact remained that, with the
issue shifted from international law to valuation, it was in the interest of
Kirlin and his clients to make the vessels appear as valuable as possible.
Kirlin effectively performed this task because the Paquete Habana was
valued at $5,687.06, and the Lola at $6,643.91. 204 The government ap198. Motion to Modify Decree at 1-6, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677.
199. Brief in Opposition to Motion to Modify Decree at 1-2, The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677.
200. 175 U.S. 677, 721.
201. Interrogatories of Jose Pasos at 27, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677.
202. Interrogatories of Severo Gonzales at 22, The Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453 (1903).
203. 175 U.S. 677, 714.
204. Report of Commissioner E. O. Locke at 55-58, The Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453.
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pealed on two issues: the amount of damages, and whether the government or the naval captors should be liable. Thus, the case returned to
the Supreme Court.205
The same counsel argued the case; Hoyt by this time had been promoted to Solicitor General. Oral argument was held on March 19, 1903.
For the government, as appellant, Hoyt argued that the valuations of the
ships were excessive, and that the captors, not the United States, should
pay whatever sums were due the owners. 206 Kirlin, for the appellees,
argued that the valuations were fair and that the United States should
pay them.207
The Court's unanimous decision was announced on April 6, 1903. 208
Justice Gray died before the valuation issue reached the Court and his
successor, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, wrote the second opinion.
The Court upheld Kirlin on the question of who should pay the damages,
stating that the United States had authorized and adopted the acts of the
captors and, therefore, should be liable. 209 The Court reversed the district court on the valuation issue, however, holding that the valuations
were not supported by documentary evidence, and remanded the case to
the district court for further proceedings.2 \0
Although neither the argument nor the decision in the principal case
attracted much general public interest,211 the legal community was quick
to comment on the importance of the case. One commentator favorably
contrasted the liberal attitude of the Court toward the development of
international law with the harsh and formalistic face it had shown in The
Aduia,212 a case which mechanically applied the continuous voyage principle. 213 Another commentator praised The Paquete Habana as "an instructive instance of . . . judicial enlargement of international law."214
Hoyt himself stated that in The Paquete Habana "the harshness of war
and the mitigations founded on ethical and human considerations came
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

212.
213.
214.

Motion to Advance at 1-3, The Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453.
Brief for the United States at 18-40, The Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453.
Brief for the Appellees at 11-64, The Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453.
189 U.S. 453.
[d. at 464-65.
[d. at 466-68. The case did not come to the Supreme Court again, and none of the
district court proceedings are reported; accordingly, the final disposition of the valuation issue is not known.
The Washington Post, the Washington Evening Star, and the New York Times did
not note the argument of the case. The Washington Post reported the decision
briefly, without comment. See Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1900, at 2. Neither the
Washington Evening Star nor the New York Times reported the decision.
176 U.S. 361 (1900). The Court in The Adula upheld the taking in prize of a neutral ship that had previously gone in and out of Havana, with American permission,
to take out refugees.
Wheeler, The Law of Prize as Affected by Decisions Upon Captures Made During the
Late War Between Spain and the United States, I COLUM. L. REV. 141, ISO-52, 15556 (1901).
Baldwin, The Part Taken by Courts of Justice in the Development of International
Law, 10 YALE L.J. 1(1900).

36

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 15

into sharp contrast."215 Perhaps cognizant of the revelations in the second Paquete Habana case regarding the vessels' commercial character,
Hoyt maintained that the government had attempted to distinguish between larger and smaller coastal vessels, particularly because the smaller
ones sometimes subsisted blockaders. 216 This was something of an ex
post facto defense, because the argument was not one of the government's
principal ones. A dissenting English view came from a Justice of the
King's Bench who maintained that the exception was a precept of comity
only. He stated, in words that would have an ironic ring in the next
decade, that "in these days of less rigorous warfare," the "indulgent
treatment" of "all kinds of fishing boats" was assured. 217 An American
historian, writing some ten years after the decision, criticized the opinion
on the basis that "the boats were furnishing food to a beleaguered army,"
that "their crews were reservists of the Spanish navy," and that "they
were intending to violate a blockade" - all dubious propositions. 218 On
balance, it appears that the weight of scholarly opinion approved of The
Paquete Habana decision. Progress in international law and the amelioration of war conditions were subjects of substantial concern at that time,
and the Supreme Court's opinion made an important contribution to that
movement.
The principles governing naval warfare again became the subject of
concern when war erupted between Russia and Japan in 1904. This
struggle, the only naval war involving major powers between 1898 and
-1914, produced prize litigation that shed light on the scope of the exemption from capture. As the Supreme Court had noted in The Paquete Habana, Japan, upon the outbreak of war with China in 1894, had
announced that coastal fishing vessels would not be molested. 219 At the
beginning of the war with Russia in 1904, after making a similar announcement,220 Japanese forces captured two Russian deep-sea fishing
vessels, the Michael and the Alexander, and brought them into Sasebo
for adjudication. Counsel for the owners evidently argued for development of the exemption along the lines formulated by the Institute of International Law at Turin in 1882, which would have exempted all fishing
vessels. Although the Sasebo Prize Court rejected this defense, it recognized the existence of an exemption:
The claimants also argued that the vessel should be re215. Hoyt, Recent Development and Tendency of the Law of Prize, 12 YALE L.J. 306, 314
(1903).
216. Id.
217. Kennedy, The Exemption of Private Property at Sea from Capture in Time of War,
16 YALE L.J. 381, 382-83 (1907).
218. F. CHADWICK, THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN: THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 146-47 (1911).
219. 175 U.S. 677, 700.
220. Japanese Regulations, 1904, in H. MARTIN & J. BAKER, LAWS OF MARITIME
WARFARE AFFECTING RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF BELLIGERENTS AS EXISTING ON
AUGUST I, 1914 at 516 (1918).
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leased in accordance with the intention underlying the exemption from capture of small coastal fishing boats, but the usage
. . . arises mainly from the desire not to inflict distress upon
poor people who are not connected with the war, and the principle cannot be extended to a vessel like the "Michael," which
was the property of a company and engaged in deep-sea
fishing. 221
On appeal, the Higher Prize Court affirmed in these words:
It was also argued that a prize court need not be rigidly
bound by the rules of international law . . . but that it should
adapt its decisions to varying circumstances and create new
precedents upon lines which are an advance upon the rules of
international law. But existing international law recognizes
that an enemy vessel and enemy cargo . . . may be captured,
and the hopes expressed that action will be taken in conformity
with the resolutions of the Institute of International Law,
which have not yet become rules ofintemationallaw, cannot be
considered as grounds for appeal. 222
The Japanese courts, although recognizing the binding force of the exemption with regard to coastal fishing vessels, acutely differentiated between the consensus of nations - true customary international law and what in fact was an academic plan for improvement. In doing so,
the Japanese court upheld the idea, which characterized Justice Gray's
opinion, that international consensus could be determined by history and
practice.
The war between Japan and Russia was concluded in 1905. The
previous year, President Theodore Roosevelt had requested an opinion
from each of the powers regarding the advisability of a Second Peace
Conference to continue the work of the First Hague Peace Conference of
1899. The end of the war, and the circumstances under whiCh it was
ended, provided a favorable climate in which to begin work on such a
project. After a good deal of diplomatic jockeying, plans matured for a
Second Hague Peace Conference to meet in June of 1907.
VI.

THE SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE

The Second Hague Conference is of major importance to the history
of international arbitration and the development of rules for land warfare. Its importance to this article, however, is limited to the adoption of
rules governing naval warfare, and the effect of The Paquete Habana
thereon. The instructions from the State Department to American delegates were couched in traditional terms of American naval policy. The
delegates were to attempt to obtain a general exemption from capture for
221. The Michael, 2
222. [d. at 84-85.

RUSSIAN AND JAPANESE PRIZE CASES

80, 82 (1904).
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all noncontraband goods except when a breach of blockade was attempted, to resist efforts to expand the list of articles regarded as contraband, and to attempt to set out in detail the rights and obligations of
neutrals, in order to prevent war from spreading and to prevent squabbles between neutrals and belligerents. 223 This was traditional American
foreign policy - a disinclination to become involved in European quarrels, and a solicitude for neutral rights. 224 The instructions to the British
delegation likewise reflected traditional British maritime policy: rejection, except under conditions of general disarmament, of immunity from
capture at sea; substantial restrictions on neutral activities, including the
closing of neutral ports to foreign prizes unless in actual distress; and the
fewest possible restrictions on the import of food and peaceful raw materials by a belligerent, in view of Britain's status as a food importer. 225
The work of the Second Peace Conference was delegated to four
commissions, each responsible for one subject. The fourth commission
dealt with the rules of war at sea, and spent most of its time discussing
the issue of immunity of private property from capture. Joseph Hodges
Choate, the chief American delegate, had on June 24, 1907, shortly after
the Conference opened, presented the American proposal for immunity
consistent with his instructions. 226
The question of the immunity of coastal fishing vessels first arose on
August 2, 1907. The delegates agreed that such an exemption existed,
and one delegate argued that it should be extended to deep-sea fishers as
well. 227 The first detailed discussion of the question occurred on August
7, 1907. Count Tornielli of Italy stated that scientific ships should be
exempt, and Baron von Macchio of Austria-Hungary wanted the exemption extended to small boats engaged in local business. Commander Ferraz of Portugal proposed immunity for coastal vessels as long as they did
not approach or hinder warships.228
Choate took the floor and called the attention of the Commission to
The Paquete Rahana; he quoted Justice Gray's statement that the exemption was an established rule of international law meant to protect
only innocent vessels furnishing daily food supplies, and that it did not
afford protection to deep-sea fishermen or those participating in hostili223. See generally J. SCOTT, INSTRUCTIONS TO THE AMERICAN DELEGATES TO THE
HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES AND THEIR OFFICIAL REPORTS 82-84 (1916) (statement of Elihu Root to the United States delegation).

224. See Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796) in 35 G. WASHINGTON, THE WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON 214, 231-37 (1940).
225. A. HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES AND OTHER CONFERENCES CONCERNING THE LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR 614-25 (1909).
226. 3 J. SCOTT, THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONfERENCES: TRANSLATION OF THE OFFICIAL TEXTS 745 (1921). This is an English translation of the
official report published by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See also J.
CHOATE, THE Two HAGUE CONFERENCES 105-06 (1913).
227. J. SCOTT, supra note 226, at 887-88.
228. Id. at 900-01.
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ties. 229 He noted that the Supreme Court had held the exemption for
coastal fishing vessels was a rule of customary international law which
prize courts must apply in the absence of treaty or statute. Choate emphasized that the vessels in The Paquete Habana fit within the exemption
because they were engaged in furnishing the daily supply of fish to feed
the city of Havana. 230
The issue of immunity for coastal fishing vessels was sent to the
Committee of Examination for the preparation of a draft convention.
None of the members of this committee denied the existence of the exemption; the issue concerned its limits. Committee members wrangled
over whether a certain distance from the coast should be specified for
"coastal" vessels, whether powered boats should be included within the
ambit of the exception, whether the convention should contain provisions
for indemnity, and similar matters.23I Eventually a report to the fourth
commission was produced by the French delegate, Henri Fromageot,
who was strongly influenced by The Paquete Habana approach. The report cited The Paquete Habana and stated that the exemption was an
ancient custom, which now had received universal approval. The exemption served a humanitarian purpose: "[T]o avoid doing poor people, who
are especially deserving of interest, an injury which would be of no benefit to the belligerent."232 Moreover, it was unwise to set limits on tonnage, crew size, or distance from shore in deciding whether the
exemption applied, because these were matters that should be taken into
account on a case-by-case basis in deciding whether a particular ship and
crew were harmless, peaceful, and deserving of protection. 233
The draft convention chapter, unanimously approved by the fourth
commission, combined Belgian and Portuguese proposals on fishing
boats, an Austro-Hungarian proposal on small trading vessels, and an
Italian proposal on scientific/philanthropic vessels. 234 It became Chapter II of Hague Convention XI, which, after an allowance is made for the
treatment of vessels other than fishing smacks, is distinctly reminiscent in
tone and content of language contained in The Paquete Habana:
Chapter II.
Exemption from Capture of
Certain Vessels.
Article 3.
Vessels employed exclusively in coast fisheries, or small
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

1£1. at 902-03; see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708 (1900).
1. SCO'IT, supra note 226, at 902-03.
1£1. at 957-62, 968-73, 1006.
Id. at 1009.
Id. at 1010-12.

C. DAVIS, THE UNITED STATES AND HIE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE
231-32 (1975); A. HIGGINS, supra note 225, at 403-05; see supra note 228 and accompanying text.
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boats employed in local trade, are exempt from capture, together with their appliances, rigging, tackle, and cargo.
This exemption ceases as soon as they take any part whatsoever in hostilities.
The Contracting Powers bind themselves not to take advantage of the harmless character of the said vessels in order to
use them for military purposes while preserving their peaceful
appearance.
Article 4.
Vessels charged with religious, scientific, or philanthropic
missions are likewise exempt from capture. 235
The prescience of Justice Gray's estimation regarding the development of
international law on the subject of exemption from capture was apparent
from the reaction of the nations when the convention was opened for
signature. All but four of the nations represented at the conference
signed the convention. Moreover, none of the signatories attached any
reservations thereto. 236
Although it is difficult to assess accurately the effect of The Paquete
Habana on the adoption of Hague Convention XI, its influence appears
to have been substantial. There was agreement from the outset that some
form of immunity existed, but disagreement as to the form it should take.
Choate's citation of The Paquete Habana to the commission, its influence
on Fromageot's report, and the wording of the convention article itself,
all show the influence of Justice Gray's historical analysis and conclusions. Matters had come full circle in less than a single decade. Justice
Gray had canvassed an enormous range of sources to establish the existence of the exemption as a rule of customary international law. The
Hague Convention used Justice Gray's opinion to transmute that customary consensus into a multilateral rule of positive international law.
VII.

WORLD WAR I

Following the Hague Conference of 1907, immunity of coastal fishing vessels generally was accepted as a rule of international law. Germany in 1909, France in 1912, and Austria-Hungary in 1913 revised
their prize rules to follow the provisions of Hague Convention XI. 237
Treatise writers of various nations, including Great Britain, treated it as
an established rule of internationallaw. 238 The United States, which had
235. A. HIGGINS, supra note 225, at 396-97.
236. [d. at 406, 537; see I J. SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899
1907 at 134-37 (1909) (Fourth Commission's work considered a failure).
237. H. MARTIN & J. BAKER, supra note 220, at 516-17.
238. H. BONFII.S, MANUEl. DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 873-75 (1912); C.

AND

DuPUIS, LE DROIT DE LA GUERRE MARITIME D'APRES LES CONfERENCES DE l.A
HAYE ET DE LONDRES 206-11 (1911); J. HAl.L, THE LAW OF NAVAl.. WARfARE
94-95 (1921); 2 J. WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAl. LAW 155-60 (1913).
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included the coastal fishery exception in its Naval Code of 1900, issued
new draft instructions in 1913 which comported with Hague Convention
XI.239
Much of this certainty, however, evaporated with the outbreak of
war in Europe in August of 1914. The primary naval belligerents, Great
Britain and Germany, plunged into blockade confrontation with each
other over a period of several months. In November of 1914, Britain
declared the entire North Sea a war zone, ostensibly in response to German minelaying. Britain's proclamation specifically subjected fishermen
to capture, thus raising questions as to their immunity under chapter II,
article three, of Hague Convention XI. The practical effect of the British
proclamation, however, given the territory involved, was primarily on
deep-sea fishers. In a retaliatory declaration, Germany declared the waters around Britain a war zone, and stated that all enemy merchant vessels within the zone would be destroyed. In response to the German
declaration, British Orders in Council of March 11, 1915, imposed a de
facto blockade on Germany (earlier, France and Britain had imposed a
formal blockade on the German colonies in East Africa). 240
The international law problems with such blockading and counterblockading arose because neither Britain nor Germany followed the
classical "close-in" form used by the United States in 1898, where ships
steamed a short distance outside a port to intercept blockade runners.
By 1914, technology had advanced to the point that a close-in blockade
of a well-armed adversary was virtually impossible. 241 This was due primarily to one improved weapon - the mine - and one new weapon the submarine. Britain, which opposed mining as she opposed anything
that limited the effectiveness of her surface fieet, regarded the act of mining as dishonorable. German mining was the pretext for the first British
war zone action.242 Germany's chief dilemma, however, concerned the
submarine, which by its nature could not take prizes into port for adjudication. 243 Moreover, the British began arming merchant ships, which
meant that German submarines could no longer surface, warn the prize
that it would be destroyed, and allow the crew to leave, without running
an unacceptable risk of destruction. The only alternatives open to Germany were abandonment of submarine warfare, thereby relinquishing its
239. H. MARTIN & J. BAKER, supra note 220, at 516; G. WILSON, DRAFT No.2 FOR
PROVISIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NAVY DEFINING THE RIGHTS OF BELI.IGERENTS AND NEUTRALS, LAWS OF BLOCKADE AND CONTRABAND OF WAR 20
(1913).
240. Garner, Some Questions of International Law in the European War, 9 AM. J. INT'L
L. 594, 594-96 (1915).
241. Holtzoff, Some Phases of the Law of Blockade, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 53, 57 (1916).
242. See A. HIGGINS, supra note 225, at 618, for a discussion of British opposition to the
use of mines.
243. Huberich & King, The Development of German Prize Law, 18 COLUM. L. REV. 503,
517-18 (1918); see The Tello (Superior Court of Prize, June 28, 1916) (German
submarine unsuccessfully attempted to take a Swedish ship into a German port for
adjudication).
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only weapon against the British long-distance blockade, or engagement
in unlimited submarine warfare, which meant that German submarines
would attack British shipping without first providing a warning.
For two years Germany struggled to use the submarine weapon effectively without bringing the United States into the war. The German
effort ended in failure and is beyond the scope of this article. It should be
pointed out, however, that the German attitude that international law
must take cognizance of technological developments which may require
modifications in the rules of naval warfare, or jettisoning of outmoded
rules, seems to be more in line with Justice Gray's idea of international
law as a dynamic, developing entity than the British attitude that the
submarine - which had never been condemned either by treaty or international custom - was per se unlawful,244 Recent scholarship has upheld, in a convincing manner, the legality under international law of the
German "operational area" submarine actions in both World Wars.24S
Although long-distance blockading made contact between coastal
fishing vessels and blockaders unlikely, cases involving the exception
arose during the war in both British and French courts. The leading case
was The Berlin,246 involving a seventy-nine ton German fishing boat captured 110 miles off Scotland on August 5, 1914.247 In arguing for condemnation, counsel for the Crown maintained that if the vessel were
fishing it could not be coastal, and that if it were not coastal it was taking
part in hostilities. The Crown further maintained that, because the Berlin was salting the fish, not taking them in alive, it was not a coastal
fishing boat. 248
The judge, Sir Samuel Evans, began his opinion by paying tribute to
The Paquete Habana:
The history of the varying practices in this and other countries of exempting from capture in war vessels engaged in coast
fishing, up to the year 1899 has been given in the Supreme
Court of the United States of America in the case of the Paquete Habana and the Lola. The judgment of the court was
delivered by Mr. Justice Gray. It is full of research, learning,
and historical interest. As such an elaborate and complete resume is available in that judgment, it would be a work of super244. [d. at 508-09 (German view was that prize law was national law. which was to be
applied even if in conflict with principles of international law). For a British view.
see James, Modem Developments a/the Law a/Prize, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 50S. 51011 (1927) (principles of international law allow the sinking of enemy vessels solely
for reasons of urgent military necessity).
245. W. MAI.LlSON, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF NAVAl. WARFARE: SUBMARINES IN
GENERAl. AND LIMITED WARFARE 52-86 (1968).
246. 2 Lloyd 43 (1914); see J. GARNER, PRIZE LAW DURING THE WORLD WAR: A
STUDY OF THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE PRIZE COURTS 1914-1924, at 240-43
(1927).
247. J. HAI.L, supra note 238, at 95.
248. 2 Lloyd 43, 43-59 (1914).
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erogation for me to attempt to perform a similar task.249
After reviewing the Russo-Japanese War cases of The Michael and The
Alexander,250 Evans, without deciding the question of the applicability of
Hague Convention XI, held that the exemption "has become a sufficiently settled doctrine and practice of the law of nations."25I The Berlin, however, did not come within the purview of the exemption because
"by reason of her size, equipment, and voyage, she was a deep-sea fishing
vessel engaged in a commercial enterprise which formed part of the trade
of the enemy country, and as such was properly captured as prize of
war."252 In a later case, The Stoer,253 involving a trawler which had been
captured off the Shetland Islands and sunk because of the lack of a prize
crew, Evans reiterated his view that deep-sea trawlers were not entitled
to any immunity from capture. 254
A French case, The Marbrouck,255 arose out of the war in the Middle East. In this case there does not seem to be any doubt as to the vessels' coastal nature; they were small schooners carrying the Turkish flag.
The question was whether the vessels were "taking part in hostilities"
and thereby had forfeited the exemption. The French prize court held
that the boats had participated in hostilities by providing food to blockaded ports in Syria and Asia Minor and therefore were good prize. 256
This finding is somewhat troubling, however, unless the boats were operating under military orders; if boats become participants in warfare
merely by taking in a cargo of fish, the exemption is rendered virtually
useless.
On balance, the belligerents appear to have consistently adhered to
the exemption during World War 1.257 The long-distance blockade made
contact with coastal fishing vessels uncommon, and the few cases that
did arise generally involved deep-sea vessels. 258 Nonetheless, the utility
249. [d. at 63-64.
250. See supra notes 221-22.
251. 2 Lloyd 43,66 (1914). The question of the applicability of Hague Convention XI to
the facts of this case remains unanswered. Article 9 of the Convention provided
that it was not to apply to a war unless all of the belligerents were parties to it. A.
HIGGINS, supra note 225, at 401. Montenegro, a belligerent, had not signed it.
252. [d. at 67-69.
253. 5 Lloyd 18 (1916).
254. [d. at 19.
255. [1918] JOURNAL OFFICIEL 5506 (June 25, 1918).
256. C. CoLOMBOS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIZE 147 (1940).
257. Professor Lassa Oppenheim claimed that Germany sank British boats during World
War I, but did not elaborate. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 266 (1921). If this were true, it is likely that the British boats were larger deepsea vessels, because a submarine, even if it could get into coastal waters, would
hardly waste one of its limited supply of torpedoes or call attention to itself by
surfacing to destroy a small coastal smack.
258. The only American case was The S.S. Appam, 243 U.S. 124 (1917), which involved
an attempt by a German prize crew to take a British prize into Hampton Roads and
keep her there indefinitely. The Supreme Court affirmed a decree that had restored
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of the rule as a matter of international law was evident to the belligerents,
and it survived the great struggle.
Although the interwar years of 1918-39 saw a great deal of attention
paid to the reduction of naval armaments, little attention was paid to the
law of prize. One relevant international agreement was article twentytwo of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 governing submarine warfare. 259 The treaty provided for tacit recognition of the legality of submarine warfare; however, with regard to recognition of the submarine as
a weapon which had revolutionized naval warfare, the language of the
treaty was ambivalent. The treaty contained provisions that required a
submarine, before sinking a merchantman, to surface and allow the crew
and passengers to go to a place of safety; the merchantman's life boats
constituted "a place of safety" only if proximity to land or shipping made
them so. If this provision were read literally, it would have imposed impossible conditions, conditions that were ignored by all belligerents who
conducted submarine warfare in World War II.
If read in the context of the traditional immunities afforded vessels
not participating in hostilities (immunities which included The Paquete
Habana principle), however, the treaty was a reasonable approach to
submarine warfare and was generally adhered to by the belligerents in
World War II. The requirement that a submarine surface prior to attack
made tactical sense only if the merchantmen were unarmed and not participating in hostilities; otherwise, the risk was unacceptable. Armed
merchantmen, being participants in warfare, forfeited immunity and
were subject to attack without warning. Unarmed merchantmen, which
actively participated in hostilities by such acts as travelling in convoys or
serving as troop transports, likewise were subject to attack. In a general
war such as World War II, essentially all belligerent merchantmen might
be deemed to be actively participating in hostilities; therefore, it was reasonable to treat all enemy merchantmen, except perhaps isolated vessels
outside operational zones or far from usual shipping lanes, as subject to
attack without warning. 26O Even neutral merchantmen integrated into
the enemy war effort could be so attacked. 261 This policy took into account both the humanitarian values which underlay the traditional immunity of noncombatant vessels and belligerents' interest in the use of
the submarine as an effective anticommerce weapon.
VIII.

WORLD WAR II

The history of World War II with respect to blockade is similar to
the ship and cargo to their owners, on the basis that an American treaty with Germany did not permit the indefinite layup of German prizes in American ports.
259. International Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, Apr.
22, 1930, art. XXII, 46 Stat. 2858,2881-2882, T.S. No. 830, at 27, 112 U.N.T.S. 65,
88.
260. W. MALLISON, supra note 245, at 119-20.
261. [d. at 129-30.
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that of World War I, except that the struggle was fought on a broader
scale. The development of aircraft as means of antiship and antisubmarine warfare, together with improvements in submarines and mines,
made the long-range aspect of the blockade even more acute. Germany
carried on unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic, as did the
United States in the Pacific after 1941. The long-range aspect made contact between hostile warships and coastal fishing vessels highly unlikely,
and, as a result, there were fewer prize cases than there had been during
World War I. Because Germany's surface fleet was "bottled up" for
most of the war and emerged only for hit-and-run raiding, prize taking
and adjudication by Germany was essentially nonexistent. Only Britain
had any sizable number of prize cases, and these dealt mostly with contraband and reprisa1. 262 There were no cases involving fishing boats.263
The United States had in 1941, as in 1917, directed its navy to exempt coastal fishing vessels from capture. 264 Very few prize cases came
into American courts until the end of the war, when several German
vessels docked in cities captured by American ground forces were libeled
in prize. By the end of 1945, eleven prize libels were pending in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.265
World War II contributed little to prize law, except for refinement
of the law of contraband and of procedure. 266 The Paquete Habana principle, although not formally challenged, may have seemed archaic after
the war because the long-distance blockades used in World War II did
not concern themselves with coastal fishing vessels. The direction of
warfare since 1945, however, has taken a different turn, and The Paquete
Habana has kept its place in the law of naval warfare.
IX.

THE PAQUETE HABANA PRINCIPLE IN LIMITED WARS
AFTER 1945
After 1945, warfare took a turn which was not necessarily foresee-

262. Rowson, British Prize Law. 1939-1944, 61 L.Q. REV. 49 (1945); Rowson, British
Prize Law. 1944-1946,63 L.Q. REV. 337 (1947). At the outbreak of war, Britain and
the continental countries had issued new prize rules, evidently expecting more cases
than in fact occurred. After the United States entered the war, Philip C. Jessup
criticized the Southern District of New York for issuing prize rules that were essentially glosses on those of 1861. Jessup, Prize Rules, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 452, 452-54
(1942). See also Sereni, Italian Prize Courts. 1866-1942, 37 AM. J. INT'L L. 248
(1943).
263. A British author writing in 1940 stated that Germany had "bombed, machinegunned or sunk" over 200 fishing vessels in the first year of the war. See C.
COLOMBOS, supra note 256, at 252. There is no way of knowing how many, if any,
of these were exempt coastal vessels.
264. UNITED STATES NAVY, TENTATIVE INSTRUCTIONS FOR GOVERNING MARITIME
AND AERIAL WARFARE 7 (1941).
265. Knauth, supra note 91. Most of these were unreported. For reported American
prize cases, see The Europa, 80 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) and Ling v. 1689 Tons
of Coal Lying Aboard S.S. Wilhelmina, 78 F. Supp. 57 (W.O. Wash. 1942).
266. Knauth, supra note 91, at 69.
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able. General declared wars were replaced by limited wars,267 fought for
limited objectives. Because many of these wars were fought in less developed parts of the world where coastal fisheries of the traditional type
operated, attempts at naval interdiction or blockade in such situations
involved The Paquete Habana principle. Two of the most notable limited
wars, Korea and Vietnam, involved the United States in situations of
naval blockade or interdiction.
The Korean War involved a theater of operations that was conducive to establishment of a classical naval blockade. Both North and
South Korea, which occupy a peninsula that extends southward from
China, were accessible to naval action. Moreover, North Korea had a
small navy and little airpower that it could use to harass blockade ships.
Thus, a close naval blockade of North Korea was a feasible strategy.
The blockade was formally proclaimed in July, 1950, by President
Truman. 268
During the Korean War, the United States openly flouted The Paquete Habana principle by seizing and summarily destroying all coastal
fishing vessels that its forces could capture. This policy began in September 1950, with a leaflet campaign which informed North Korean fishermen that their boats would be destroyed or confiscated and their crews
beached if they fished prior to the expulsion of the Communists. The
rationale behind this policy was that fish were such an important part of
the Korean diet that foodstuffs could be regarded as contraband. Moreover, there had been numerous instances of fishing boats engaging in
minelaying or military communications. It was thought that the interdiction of fishing vessels would vastly increase North Korea's supply
problems. 269
267. For a discussion of the pre-1967 Arab-Israeli limited war situation, see Brown,
World War Prize Law Applied in a Limited War Situation: Egyptian Restrictions on
Neutral Shipping with Israel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 849, 856-73 (1966). The mining of
the Red Sea, which damaged at least 19 commercial vessels in July and August of
1984, is difficult to assess in light of The Paquete Habana principle. Despite intense
efforts by several nations, only one mine was recovered, and no one has claimed
responsibility for laying the mines. Nonetheless, from the minuscular amount of
evidence available, it does not appear that the immunity of coastal fishermen was
seriously threatened. Evidently, none of the damaged vessels were engaged in
coastal fishing, although one Soviet commercial, refrigerated fish carrier was damaged. The mine recovered was a Soviet device, some 10 feet long and activated by a
timer. It was found at a depth of over 125 feet, which does not suggest an intention
to harm coastal fishing vessels. It appears more likely that the mine was planted to
interdict commercial shipping bound for the Suez Canal, an objective which does
not violate The Paquete Habana principle. N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1984, at A3, col.
1; id., Aug. 15, 1984, at 1, col. 2; id., Aug. 14, 1984, at 1, col. 6; id., Aug. 12, 1984,
at 12, col. 1; id., Aug. 9, 1984, at A5, col. 1; id., Aug. 8,1984, at A8, col. 1; id., Aug.
6, 1984, at 1, col. 2; Washington Post, Oct. 12, 1984, at A31, col. I; id., Oct. 4,1984,
at A23, col. 5; id., Oct. 1, 1984, at A 18, col. 1; id., Sept. 25, 1984, at A 18, col. 2.
268. M. CAGLE & F. MANSON, THE SEA WAR IN KOREA 281 (1957).
269. !d. at 296-97; Clark, Recent Evolutionary Trends Concerning Naval Interdiction of
Seaborne Commerce as a Viable Sanctioning Device, 27 JAG J. 160, 174 (1973); W.
MALLISON, supra note 245, at 127.
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The overwhelmingly superior American naval forces easily eliminated North Korean deep-sea fishing. North Korean coastal fishing,
however, was much more difficult to eliminate, because the fishermen
subsisted on their catch and continued to challenge the blockade in order
to eat. Moreover, their simple wooden boats could be replaced easily if
they were destroyed, and the heavy-draft American ships often were unable to come near the coast. 270
The effectiveness of the blockade as a military measure is somewhat
difficult to assess; however, conditions that resulted from imposition of
the blockade appear to provide support for the humanitarian values implicit in The Paquete Habana opinion and undermine the blockade strategy on practical grounds. The blockade was damaging to the North
Koreans insofar as it caused substantial suffering among the fishermen
and other civilians. A large number of North Korean civilians were
forced to cross over the American lines looking for food.271 There is no
indication, however, that the combat effectiveness of North Korean or
Chinese troops was seriously affected. On balance, the decision by the
United States openly to disregard The Paquete Habana principle during
the Korean war reasserted the relevance of both the humanity rationale
and the pragmatism underlying The Paquete Habana opinion. Fishing
vessels that actually engaged in hostilities rightfully were taken; however,
the imposition of a general interdiction on coastal fishing was neither
good law nor good policy. The American action occupied a large
number of naval personnel who could have been used more effectivley
elsewhere. Moreover, the destruction of coastal fishing vessels caused
substantial civilian suffering; yet, because the North Koreans fed their
soldiers first, destruction of the vessels did not have the desired military
effect upon the enemy.
The other significant limited war in which the United States was
involved was the protracted conflict in Vietnam. 272 During the Vietnam
conflict, the United States kept its naval operations on a lower key than it
had in Korea; accordingly, there was no formal declaration of blockade.
The magnitude of United States naval forces in Southeast Asia, however,
was greater than that involved in Korea. Three different operations in
the Vietnam naval theater are relevant to this article: Operation Market
Time, Operation Sea Dragon, and the mining of the North Vietnamese
coast.
Operation Market Time was a joint operation conducted by the
270. M. CAGLE & F. MANSON, supra note 268, at 297.
271. Id. at 353-57.
272. The naval "quarantine" of Cuba in 1962 was deployed to prevent warships and
merchantmen from reaching the island, and was conducted on a long-range basis, so
that the fishing vessel question did not arise. See generally Christol & Davis, Maritime Quarantine: The Naval Interdiction of Offensive Weapons and Associated Material to Cuba. 1962, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 525 (1963); Mallison, Limited Naval
Blockade or Quarantine-Interdiction: National and Collective Self-Deji?l1se Claims
Valid Under International Law, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 335 (1962).
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United States and South Vietnam off the South Vietnamese coast. The
purpose of the operation was to control infiltration of men and material
by sea. The operation was based not on blockade, because blockade was
viewed as an act of war, but on South Vietnam's inherent right to control
passage through its territorial waters. Under the 1958 Geneva Covention
on the Law of the Sea,273 South Vietnam, for security reasons, could suspend the right of innocent passage up to twelve miles offshore. 274 American and South Vietnamese warships plied the coasts of South Vietnam,
stopping and searching suspicious vessels. The scope of the operations
was enormous; between 1965 and 1967, the American forces discovered
73,000 vessels, inspected 15,000 vessels, and boarded 6,000 vessels; the
South Vietnamese inspected 204,000 vessels. 275 Although coastal fishing
vessels were not exempt from inspection, Operation Market Time conformed to the essence of The Paquete Habana principle because such
vessels were not molested unless they carried contraband or engaged in
the hositilites. 276
Operation Sea Dragon more closely resembled a classical blockade
because it involved action off the enemy coast. Essentially, Operation
Sea Dragon consisted of operations within twelve miles of the North
Vietnamese coast aimed at interdicting North Vietnamese logistical support for its forces in the south. It included surveillance of vessels, destruction of water-borne logistic craft, and naval gunfire aimed at shore
points. Particularly notable was the length to which the American forces
in this "quasi-close blockade" situation went to comply with The Paquete
Habana principle and the requirements of Hague Convention XI. Because it was difficult to distinguish boats engaged in fishing from those
taking part in hostilities, a detailed study was made of fishing practices in
the Gulf of Tonkin. From this study, a profile was created which purported to characterize legitimate fishermen. Detailed operational orders
were drafted on the basis of this profile; the objective was to perform the
military mission without molesting peaceful fishermen. 277 This was an
innovative and praiseworthy attempt to obey the dictates of international
law in a complex limited war situation.
The mining of the North Vietnamese coasts, and later Haiphong
harbor, in 1972 and 1973 was essentially a "blockade" achieved through
the use of mines; its objective was to interdict traffic to North Vietnam
while minimizing the potential for a naval confrontation. Here, as in
Operation Sea Dragon, the United States used ingenious methods to
achieve military objectives while attempting to afford coastal fishing ves273. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, art.
XVI, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1611, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 216.
274. Carlisle, The Interrelationship of International Law alld United States Naval Operations in Southeast Asia, 22 JAG J. 8, 11-13 (1967); O'Connell, Internatiollal Law
and Contemporary Naval Operations, 44 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 19,24-25 (1970).
275. Carlisle, supra note 274, at 13.
276. Id.
277. O'Connell, supra note 274, at 33-35.
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sels their traditional immunity. Magnetic mines were used which would
explode if touched by the metal hull of a merchantman, but not if
touched by the wooden hull of a fishing boat. Contemporaneously, the
United States announced it would use other forms of mines if the fishing
boats were used for military purposes. 278 The mining achieved its objective. It forced North Vietnam to the bargaining table; however, it did so
without compromising the humanitarian values inherent in The Paquete
Rahana exemption.
In Vietnam, the United States fought a war of naval interdiction
with a scrupulous regard for international law and, indeed, a willingness
to use innovative methods to comply with its responsibilities in new and
difficult situations. This effort evidences the continuing validity of The
Paquete Rahana principle.
A recent development involving the United States, although not to
the extent of the limited wars in Korea and Vietnam, also brings to mind
The Paquete Rahana principle. In April, 1984, it was revealed that Latin
American employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, operating from
CIA-controlled ships, had laid mines in and near the Nicaraguan harbors
of Corinto and Puerto Sandino, on the Pacific coast, and EI Bluff, on the
Caribbean coast.279 The mines were rather crude handmade acoustic devices, evidently designed to explode noisily, cause minimal damage, and
thus frighten away ships instead of sinking them. 280 Some eight ships,
however, were sunk or damaged by the mines. 281 The majority of these
were non-Nicaraguan freighters and tankers; however, two Nicaraguan
fishing boats were sunk, with two fatalities and a number of injuries. A
number of crewmen on the non-Nicaraguan ships were also injured. 282
The episode caused a furor in Congress,283 and eventually resulted in the
passage of a nonbinding "sense of the Congress" resolution opposing the
use of any appropriated funds for the mining of Nicaraguan ports or
waters. 284
\
Although the facts surrounding the laying of mines in Nicaraguan
waters are by no means completely clear, the destruction of Nicaraguan
coastal fishing vessels makes The Paquete Rahana principle relevant. It
278. Clark, supra note 269, at 175-78; Swayze, Traditional Principles of Blockade in Modern Practice: United States Mining of Internal and Territorial Waters of North Vietnam, 29 JAG J. 143, 159 (1977).
279. Wall Street Journal, Apr. 6, 1984, at 6, col. I; Washington Post, Apr. 7, 1984, at
AI, col. 1.
280. Washington Post, Apr. 7, 1984, at AI, col. 1; 130 Congo Rec. H2897 (daily ed. Apr.
12, 1984) (statement of Rep. Siljander).
281. Washington Post, Apr. 7, 1984, at AI, col. I; 130 Congo Rec. S4140-41 (daily ed.
Apr. 9, 1984) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); Congo Rec. H2885 (daily ed. Apr. 12,
1984) (statement of Rep. Weiss).
282. Washington Post, Apr. 7, 1984, at AI, col. 1.
283. Washington Post, Apr. II, 1984, at AI, col. 5; id., Apr. 10, 1984, at AI, col. 3; Wall
Street Journal, Apr. 10, 1984, at 2, col. 2.
284. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2907, 98 Stat. 494, 1210
(1984).
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appears that the mines were laid indiscriminately, both in and around the
harbors, in order to deter commerce and navigation. 285 At least one of
the ports, El Bluff, is relatively small and obscure, precisely the sort of
harbor from which coastal fishermen frequently operate. 286 Although it
is not certain the two fishing boats sunk were the sort of coastal vessels
that The Paquete Habana principle protects, the indiscriminate mine laying in harbors and waters used by protected coastal fishermen demonstrates an insensitivity to the immunity afforded fishing vessels under
international law. The United States clearly failed to operate in Nicaragua with the sensitivity to international law that it demonstrated during
the Vietnam conflict.

x.

THE LARGER HERITAGE OF THE PAQUETE HABANA

Before concluding a study of the influence of The Paquete Habana,
it is necessary to examine its general influence on American law, outside
the law of naval warfare. Justice Gray's statement that "international
law is part of our law,"287 and his view of international law as a growing
and changing consensus of nations, have borne fruit recently in some
remarkable opinions from the federal courts.
The basic principle that United States courts must determine and
apply international law has been recognized in many contexts, including
the Trading With The Enemy Act,288 the interdiction ofnarcotics,289 and
even litigation concerning the conditions in United States prisons. 290 Recently, The Paquete Habana has been applied in two cases that illustrate
the enduring quality of Justice Gray's concern for an effective and developing corpus of international law.
Fernandez v. Wilkinson 291 was a habeas corpus proceeding involving
a Cuban "boat person" who had been jailed without a hearing for violating United States immigration laws. The McCarran-Walter Act 292 (the
immigration statute) provided an excludable alien with no remedy for
arbitrary detention. The district court held, however, that international
law did provide such a remedy, and cited The Paquete Habana and Filartiga v. Pena-Irala 293 as authority for the development of international
law, its sources, and its place in American law. Finding that freedom
285. Washington Post, Apr. 7, 1984, at AI, col. 1; 130 Congo Rec. H2885 (daily ed. Apr.
12, 1984) (statement of Rep. Weiss).
286. 130 Congo Rec. S4140-41 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1984) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
287. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
288. Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
289. United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1207 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831
(1979).
290. Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1192 (D. Conn. 1980), modified, 651 F.2d 96
(2d Cir. 1981).
291. 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), ajJ'd on other grounds sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilk, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
292. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.c. § 11 0 lI!).
293. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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from arbitrary detention was a right secured by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,294 the court cited the United Nations Charter295
and a concurring opinion in the International Court of Justice in the
South- West Africa Cases 296 to the effect that international consensus and
custom can bind non signatories to the terms of an international agreement. 297 The court emphasized the growth and development of a customary international law of human rights and ordered the petitioner's
release within a set time. 298
Even more striking is Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,299 a case which closely
parallels The Paquete Habana. The plaintiffs were Paraguayan citizens
who had applied for asylum in the United States. They brought a civil
action against the defendant, a Paraguayan visiting the United States,
under the Alien Tort Statute 300 for the wrongful death of their son by
torture in Paraguay. The issue was whether the district court had jurisdiction over such an action. The court of appeals cited The Paquete Habana for the proposition that a rule of comity could ripen into settled
international law, stating that courts must interpret international law "as
it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today."30\ The
court, in the manner of Justice Gray, proceeded to survey the international law on the subject of torture, to discern whether there was a consensus as to the law and, if so, to determine what the consensus was. It
examined the United Nations Charter,302 the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,303 General Assembly Resolution 2625 of 1970 on international law, 304 and General Assembly Resolution 3452 of 1975 on the
protection of persons from being subjected to torture. 305 Noting that the
General Assembly had adopted these resolutions by consensus and without dissent,306 the court conducted further examination of the works of
jurists and publicists on the subject. 307 Following its examination, the
court concluded that torture was a violation of customary international
law, and that the Alien Tort Statute granted the district court jurisdiction to adjudicate rights secured by international law. 308 The court
294. 3 U.N. GAOR C.3 Annexes (Agenda Item 58) at 535, U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948).
295. U.N. CHARTER.
296. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Nambia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.e.]. 16, 76 (Ammoun, V.P., concurring).
297. /d.
298. 505 F. Supp. 787, 796-800 (D. Kan. 1980).
299. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
300. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
301. 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980).
302. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
304. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
305. G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975).
306. 630 F.2d 876, 893 (2d Cir. 1980).
307. [d. at 883-84.
308. [d. at 881-89.
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closed with an eloquent statement which echoed Justice Gray's findings
on the international consensus on naval warfare:
In the modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations
have combined to lead the nations of the world to recognize
that respect for fundamental rights is in their national and collective self-interest. Among the rights universally proclaimed
by all nations, as we have noted, is the right to be free of physical torture. Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the torturer
has become - like the pirate and the slave trader before him hostis humani generis, an enemy to all mankind. Our holding
today. . . is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the
ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence. 309
Certainly these opinions, based not only on The Paquete Habana
itself, but also on Justice Gray's methodology and his conception of an
evolving body of international law, are fitting tributes to the continued
importance of the ideals of The Paquete Habana to American
jurisprudence.
XI.

CONCLUSION

The Paquete Habana did not emerge ex nihilo. The decision, like
the sources it canvassed, was the product of an extended development of
international law. A century of American prize and admiralty law and a
tradition of international law dating back to Justice Marshall contributed
to Justice Gray's opinion. Nonetheless, this should not denigrate Justice
Gray's contribution. His prodigious historical research, his sense of order, and his conception of a living and growing international law based
on the consensus of nations made The Paquete Habana an important
precedent in international law.
The opinion exerted a strong influence on the law of naval warfare.
It established a principle of immunity, later incorporated into an international convention, which has survived two world wars and numerous
smaller ones. Recent experience in Vietnam demonstrates that the
United States will go to extraordinary lengths to comply with The Paquete Habana principle. Perhaps more important than the principle itself
is the illustration it provides of the survival and progression of international law through great upheavals and difficult times.
The Paquete Habana, however, is more than merely a decision about
naval warfare. Its declaration that "international law is part of our law"
is both a hope and a promise - a hope for the continued development of
a system of world order based on international consensus and a promise
of American participation in the development of that system. As is apparent from Filartiga v. Pena-Irala 31O and Fernandez v. Wilkinson,311 the
309. [d. at 890.
310. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
311. 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980).
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development of international law continues to inform our judiciary. The
thread running through the lengthy historical analysis is the survival and
development of international law. Justice Gray might well be pleasantly
surprised at the innovations the United States used in Vietnam to comply
with international law and the use of The Paquete Rahana in such areas
as immigration law. But in one respect, Justice Gray would not be surprised. The vitality of customary international law continues. Although
the form of international law may vary with the times and the needs of
nations, it will endure. This is the true import of The Paquete Rahana.

